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SECTION 1.  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The probability of the size and duration of another oil disruption is critical to estimating 
the value of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) and its desired size.  Recent changes in world 
events, tensions in other parts of the world, and energy markets (oil price decreases), along with 
the dramatic surge in North American tight oil supplies from shale formations have renewed 
interest by the Department of Energy (DOE) and other parties in understanding the risk of major 
oil disruptions. 
 
The Energy Modeling Forum at Stanford University developed a risk assessment 
framework and evaluated the likelihood of one or more foreign oil disruptions over the next ten 
years.  Although it was recognized that domestic and weather-related oil disruptions could also 
be very damaging, we were asked to focus the effort specifically upon geopolitical, military and 
terrorist causes for disruptions outside the U.S.  A broader study of all sources for future 
disruptions would have required an assessment of more experts, which would not have been 
possible given the resources and time frame available for the project. 
 
The risk assessment was conducted through a series of two workshops attended by 
leading geopolitical, military and oil-market experts who provided their expertise on the 
probability of different events occurring, and their corresponding link to major disruptions in key 
oil market regions.  Special attention was made to differentiate disruptions by their magnitude, 
by their likelihood of occurrence, and by whether they are short-, long-, or very long-term in 
duration. 
 
The world oil market was divided into 5 primary regions of production:  Saudi Arabia, 
Other Persian Gulf, Africa, Latin America, and Russian / Caspian States.  Taken together these 
regions account for 57% of the world production of 98 MMBD (as projected by the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration for 2020).  The panel of experts also considered choke point 
disruptions at vulnerable shipping lanes.  Not included in the assessment were geopolitical 
disruptions from the US market and smaller global producers.  Excess capacity was considered 
as a source to mitigate oil disruptions and therefore a primary output of the assessment is “Net 
Disruptions” or the total disruption less the excess capacity available. 
  
The final results of the risk assessment convey a range of insights across the three 
dimensions of magnitude, likelihood, and length of a disruption.  These conclusions are net of 
offsets (e.g., OPEC spare capacity), with the notable exception that the SPR is not included as a 
source of offsets.  At least once during the 10-year time frame 2016-2025: 
 
 The probability of a net (of offsets) disruption of 2 MMBD (million barrels per day) or 
more lasting at least 1 month is approximately 80%. 
 The probability of a net (of offsets) disruption of 2 MMBD or more lasting at least 6 
months is approximately 63%. 
 The probability of a net (of offsets) disruption of 2 MMBD or more lasting at least 18 
months is approximately 37%. 
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 The chance of a 3 MMBD net disruption or more lasting at least 1 month is 67%; the 
chance of 5 MMBD or more is 42%. 
 The net effect of a disruption at Middle East choke points is a 4% probability for an 8 
MMBD disruption and a 15% probability of a 4 MMBD, both of which are likely to be 
mitigated within a short (6 month) time frame. 
 There is a greater probability for any disruption lasting >1 month in the Other Persian Gulf 
region (60%) comprised of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE and Oman, than in Saudi Arabia 
(48%) or Africa (48%) comprised of Algeria, Angola, Libya, and Nigeria, while the 
Russian and Caspian states have a 38% probability and Latin America the lowest chance 
(23%). 
 The chance of 5 MMBD disruption size (or greater) is 64% for interstate conflict between 
two or more standing governments in the Middle East, 36% for the current state of unrest 
and strife with insurgent groups, and 26% assuming relatively stable middle east politics as 
we saw prior to the Arab Spring. 
 
The probabilities of a disruption for the dimensions above, including Size, Duration, 
Region, and State of Middle East Conflict, are reflected in the graphs and tables in the body of 
this report, and are also summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Probability of an Oil Disruption by Size, Duration, Region, and State of ME 
Conflict  
   
 
 
> 0 MMBD > 2 MMBD > 3 MMBD > 5 MMBD
DURATION
Short 96% 80% 67% 42%
Long 82% 63%
Very Long 53% 37%
REGION
Africa 62%
Other Persian Gulf 61%
Saudi Arabia 48%
Russian / Caspian States 40%
Latin America 28%
MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT STATE > 5 MMBD
Stable politics as we saw prior to Arab Spring 26%
Current state of unrest and strife 36%
Interstate conflict with 2 or more standing governments 64%
Probability of a Disruption:
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Offsets from the use of excess capacity outside the disrupted region reduce the size of the 
disruption.  We conclude that offsets reduce the probability that the net disruption reaches any 
given size by approximately 5%-10%.  
 
A similar risk assessment was conducted by the EMF in 2005.  The current assessment 
covers five regions of the world instead of four regions, explicitly considers disruptions at choke 
points, has updated probabilities to reflect current world conditions, and has modified excess 
capacity and oil supply forecasts.  The net effect of these changes shows only a very small 
decrease in likelihood of disruptions between 4 and 7 MMBD, but similar estimates for all other 
disruption sizes. 
 
The structured framework based on decision and risk analysis techniques provided an 
efficient method to quantify the complexity surrounding oil disruption scenarios in a transparent 
and traceable logic.  The risk assessment also provided a systematic framework for supporting 
these estimates, and has demonstrated an approach that can be updated as future world events 
change. 
 
SECTION 2.  MOTIVATION 
The probability of another oil disruption is critical to the estimated value of the Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve (SPR) and its desired size.  And yet, various estimates of the risk of 
comparable disruptions during the 1990s varied by as much as a factor of five (Leiby and 
Bowman, 2003).  This disparity in results reflects that analysts use fundamentally different 
approaches and assumptions.  An additional problem is that there is no consistency in developing 
these estimates over time.  Estimates that change over time should reflect shifts in actual 
conditions influencing the true probability of a disruption rather than who conducts the study and 
with which approach.   
 
The Stanford Energy Modeling Forum has sponsored an assessment of oil disruption 
risks for the Department of Energy twice in the past 20 years (1996, 2005).  The geopolitical 
climate regarding oil production has seen significant change in the past 10 years since the 
previous study.  This fact, together with pressure to understand the value of the Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve has prompted considerable interest to update the risk assessment to reflect 
current conditions.  Responsible policymaking requires a quantitative and thoughtful evaluation 
of these important risks and overall energy security. 
 
In this study, the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum set out to accomplish three 
objectives:   
 Develop a risk assessment framework and utilize expert judgment to develop the 
overall probability of a major oil disruption 
 Characterize the likelihood, effective magnitude, and duration of potential supply 
disruptions 
 Clearly document the logic and assumptions driving the risk analyses. 
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This risk assessment is part of a larger project initiated by the Strategic Petroleum 
Reserve Office to evaluate the benefits and costs of maintaining, expanding and using public oil 
stockpiles. It addresses only one of many critical issues in the SPRO analysis. By itself, it does 
not determine what the appropriate strategy should be. Nor does it cover all the important 
considerations that influence those decisions.  
 
            In particular, given the limited time and resources for the project, this assessment limits 
its focus in the following ways: 
 The working group focused on geopolitical events leading to disruptions in global oil 
supply. Governments hold public oil stockpiles primarily to offset sudden lost production 
in the world oil market, thereby limiting price escalation during such events.  
 Participants discussed such developments as hurricanes, pandemics and cyber-attacks, 
but many of the most serious possibilities would have major implications for wellbeing 
that extend well beyond oil supplies.  Only if these events were focused on oil 
production, pipelines and shipping would they have more serious implications for 
maintaining and using public oil stockpiles.  
 The study did not evaluate all major supply regions, but only those areas where 
geopolitical and military unrest were most pronounced. The five regions selected and 
their associated countries included more than 60 percent of total world oil production. 
The study did not address weather-related disruptions but did include possible cyber-
attacks on oil production, transportation and distribution in these selected regions.  
 Due to the limitations on the number of experts who could be elicited in this analysis, the 
risks may be understated by ignoring weather-related disruptions and cyber-attacks 
outside of these regions. If further investigation finds that these factors should be 
included in future evaluations, a risk-assessment approach similar to the one used in this 
study could be applied to these other events.  
 The project focused on gross oil supply disruptions and any explicit supply offsets from 
excess oil production capacity from major producing countries.  
 The project excluded inventory responses (drawdowns and increments), including those 
of public or private oil stockpiles within or outside of the United States.  
 Public stockpile decisions by the United States were excluded because the evaluation 
focused on the oil market conditions in the absence of any drawdown of the U.S. strategic 
petroleum reserve. These conditions are most relevant to addressing the issue of whether 
or not public stockpiles should be used and by how much.  
 The purpose was to assess geopolitical supply risks, and not the responses to, or 
consequences of, those events (except for the possible use of oil-producer excess 
capacity).  Offsets also excluded any supply or demand response to price changes caused 
by the oil supply disruptions. These excluded supply adjustments include operating 
existing fields of conventional oil more intensively or extracting more volumes from oil-
shale formations. It also did not address any demand-side adjustments that policymakers 
might use during a disruption such as forcing carpooling or gasoline rationing. Demand-
reduction strategies provide gross benefit by reducing the shock, but they also impose 
costs by restricting driving patterns and causing citizens to make longer trips. The SPRO 
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already incorporates many of these adjustments in the models used for evaluating the 
benefits and costs of public oil stockpiles.  
 
Although the main benefits of maintaining and using a public oil stockpile are linked 
directly to how it influences oil prices, the risk evaluation focuses on physical volumes of oil 
removed rather than price movements. The models operated by the SPRO use the physical 
volumes of oil removed as an assumption in order to derive oil price changes, after incorporating 
all of the market and policy adjustments discussed above. 
 
Before discussing the detailed results of the risk assessment, we begin by describing the 
approach and review the key inputs developed by the experts.  We conclude with comparisons 
from past studies, and a discussion of issues to consider for future assessments. 
 
SECTION 3.  APPROACH 
Formal probabilistic risk assessments have been widely used to analyze a range of topics 
where: 
 uncertainty is paramount 
 many interrelated factors cause significant complexity 
 information is available from many sources 
 policymakers want a quantitative, logical, and defensible analysis of the associated 
risks. 
 
The most detailed, thorough and structured approach for evaluating these risks lies in 
elicitation of the views of an expert panel, such as that previously conducted by the Stanford 
Energy Modeling Forum in 1996 (Huntington, Weyant, Kann and Beccue, 1997) and in 2005 
(EMF SR8, Beccue, Huntington 2005).  This approach, drawing on the tools and principles of 
decision analysis, is based upon structured modeling where specific events are identified and 
their probabilities are evaluated.  The approach allows interdependencies to exist between events, 
thereby providing a richer evaluation of the underlying risks of disruptions.  The assessment 
incorporates expert judgment to provide an explicit quantification of the magnitude, duration and 
likelihood of oil supply events that could cause significant upward deviations in world oil prices.   
 
Expert evaluation requires considerable experience in appropriate techniques for 
uncovering unbiased responses from workshop participants.   To facilitate the assessment, we 
conducted the following steps: 
 
1. Brainstorm factors 
2. Categorize into regional vs. broader underlying events (which impact multiple regions) 
3. Develop influence diagrams to identify the relationships between events 
4. Develop scales for each event composed of two or more states 
5. Assign likelihoods for each state 
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6. Combine mathematically by analyzing all combination of outcomes and weighting them 
according to probability inputs from experts. 
PARTICIPANTS 
 Phil Beccue and Deanna Przybyla, decision analysis facilitators, and Hill Huntington 
from the Energy Modeling Forum, Stanford University, conducted a series of two workshops.  
The workshops took place in the Washington, D.C. area in September and October, 2015.  The 
panel of experts consisted of energy security and oil market experts with a broad range of 
technical expertise, diverse experiences in the key factors that affect energy security, and 
representing a wide range of institutional/organizational backgrounds.  Panel members were 
asked to represent their individual judgments and not to act as representatives of technical or 
policy positions taken by their organizations.  The participants are recorded in Table 2.  
 
 
Table 2.  Participants in the 2015 Oil Risk Assessment 
Tristan Abbey Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee 
Asmeret Asghedom DOE - Energy Information Administration 
Phillip Beccue White Deer Partners 
Cheryl Brown DOE - Office of Fossil Energy 
Patrick Clawson The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 
Matt Cline DOE - Office of International Affairs 
Robert  Corbin DOE - Office of Fossil Energy 
Chris Elsner I H S Energy 
Mark Finley British Petroleum 
Oliver Fritz DOD - OSD Operational Energy 
Melissa  Holtmeyer DOD - OSD Operational Energy 
Hill Huntington Stanford  
James  Jewell DOE - Office of Intelligence 
Frederick Joutz George Washington University 
Jim  Krane Rice University 
Sarah  Ladislaw CSIS 
Paul Leiby Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
Geoff Lyon DOE - Office of Fossil Energy 
Mariana  Manus DOE - Office of Intelligence 
Robert Murphy Chevron 
John Powell DOE - Energy Information Administration 
James  Preciado DOE - Energy Information Administration 
Deanna Przybyla White Deer Partners 
Lou Pugliaresi Energy Policy Research Foundation Incorporated 
John Shages Strategic Petroleum Consulting 
Laura Singer DOE - Energy Information Administration 
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Pete  Steen DOD - The Joint Staff J-5 
Frank Verrastro CSIS 
Lejla Villar Energy Information Administration 
Kenneth Vincent DOE - Office of Fossil Energy 
Rick Westerdale Department of State 
Andrew Zilm Department of the Treasury 
 
 
The workshops focused on incorporating expert judgment in the explicit quantification of 
the magnitude and likelihood of oil disruptions.  In the first day of the workshop in September 
2015, participants identified the key events that could lead to an oil disruption, organized the 
events, and created scales to assist in quantifying risks.  The second workshop day in October 
2015 consisted of assigning probabilities to the events that were discussed at the first workshop.  
Most of the participants in the list in Table 2 participated in both workshop days. 
 
SECTION 4.  SCOPE 
SHORTFALL DEFINITION 
Defining a shortfall is a particularly difficult challenge given the complexity of 
geopolitical events and the 10-year horizon for this study.  To help make this effort manageable, 
we asked the experts to focus on events that have the potential to cause a 2 MMBD shortfall or 
more.  An event may lead to a full loss of production from a particular region, or a partial loss.  
We considered events to be out of scope if there was no chance for at least a 2 MMBD loss.  
Therefore, we defined a disruption as:   
 
"A sudden shortfall in oil production from a world supplier that could potentially cause 2 
MMBD to become unavailable within 1 month of the beginning of the disruption.  After 
the period, world production recovers to the same level prior to the shortfall. The 
disruption occurs at least one time during the 10-year period 2016-2025."   
 
This definition provides guidance as the experts considered a range of potential events leading to 
an oil disruption.  A shortfall is not defined as a movement in prices. 
 
Major world oil supply regions include: (1) Saudi Arabia, (2) Other Persian Gulf, (3) 
Africa, (4) Latin America, and (5) Russia and Caspian states.  Note that the Africa region 
includes both North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. We focused on these five oil supply regions 
and treated each set of countries within a region as a group.  The primary oil producing countries 
in each region include: 
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The production capacity from this study’s reference case for 2020 for each region is: 
Saudi Arabia1  11.6 MMBD 
Other Persian Gulf 15.5 MMBD 
West of Suez    8.5 MMBD 
Latin America    6.1 MMBD 
Russia & Caspian  13.9 MMBD 
TOTAL   55.6 MMBD 
Major offsets to the gross disruptions consist of excess capacity carried by Saudi Arabia, as well 
as Other Persian Gulf sources.   
 
      The risk assessment framework was developed in an initial one-day structuring meeting 
with energy security experts on September 23, 2015.  The purpose of this meeting was to identify 
events that could lead to an oil disruption and organize these events into detailed influence 
diagrams that identify the primary factors contributing toward oil disruption risks, and the 
relationships between these factors.  The influence diagrams were used as guidelines in 
developing constructed scales to help characterize the range of severity for each event.  The 
output from this structuring meeting was a consensus view on the detailed influence diagrams 
and associated scales which served as a roadmap for the necessary probability assessments in the 
second set of meetings on October 28-29, 2015. 
MODEL STRUCTURE 
 The influence diagram developed for the oil security risk assessment framework captures 
the key factors affecting oil disruption risks and the dependencies between these factors.  The 
influence diagram reflecting the inputs and refinement of the September 2015 workshop is 
shown in Figure 1. 
 
  
                                                 
1 The Saudi Arabia oil production is extrapolated from an estimate of production from the OPEC Middle East region 
based on the 2014 International Energy Outlook (IEO) reference case produced by the US Energy Information 
Administration. The project team allocated the remaining OPEC Middle Eastern volumes to Other Persian Gulf. 
Production for the other regions are based upon the 2014 IEO estimates.  
Other Persian Gulf Africa Latin America Russia and Caspian
Iran Algeria Brazil Azerbaijan
Iraq Angola Mexico Kazakhstan
Kuwait Libya Venezuela Russia
Oman Nigeria Turkmenistan
Qatar Uzbekistan
UAE
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Figure 1.  World Oil Disruption Influence Diagram 
 
 
 
The rounded blue rectangles represent calculated quantities or single point input values, 
and the green ovals represent uncertain variables.  This diagram captures the primary events that 
could lead to major world oil disruptions in a form conducive to data input and analysis.  The 21 
numbered ovals represent the parameters requiring probability assessments.  The influence 
diagram has internal factors for each of the five regions, and two underlying events which could 
influence more than one event.  The internal events and underlying events impact the shortfall 
events which characterize the size and likelihood of a disruption.  Shortfalls may be offset by 
excess capacity from Saudi Arabia and/or Other Persian Gulf.  Net oil disruptions are calculated 
by summing global disruption size and subtracting net offsets (if offsets are available).  Net oil 
disruptions are expressed in million barrels per day (MMBD), or as a percentage of world 
supply. 
 
 Each of the uncertain variables (ovals on the influence diagram) requires probability 
assessments from experts.  Before we assessed the probability estimates, the experts established 
a clear and precise definition of each variable.  A scale with two or more discrete levels measures 
the variables.  The experts developed the scales during the structuring meeting by identifying 
discrete levels for each parameter that were both non-overlapping and spanned the set of 
possibilities.  Care was taken by the experts to review the variable definitions and associated 
scales before providing probability assessments.  The event definitions and scales are 
summarized in the next section and shown in detail in Appendix B. 
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DURATION OF DISRUPTION 
Disruptions are defined to last a minimum of one month before supply is resumed.  Once 
a disruption has occurred, it could either be classified as a short-duration disruption wherein 
supplies are restored within six months, a long-duration disruption that lasts between 6-18 
months, or a very long-duration disruption lasting from 18-30 months.  By this definition, all 
disruptions are in the short-duration category, since long-duration disruptions were at one time a 
short disruption.  However, a subset of disruptions falls into the long-duration category, and a 
subset of these fall into the very long-duration category.  Table 3 summarizes the three durations 
considered in the risk analysis and the months that were assumed in the calculations. 
 
Table 3.  Duration of Disruption 
 
 
 
 
DISRUPTION SIZE AND OVERLAP 
The dependencies between regions were captured with arrows on the influence diagram 
and subsequent assessments from experts.  For example, assuming a major conflict in the Middle 
East, experts provided higher estimates for the probability of a shortfall in both Saudi and Other 
Persian Gulf regions.  However, there are cases wherein a shortfall could occur in more than one 
region even without the conditioning event (e.g., internal conflict in one region, terror attack in 
another region).  In this case the question arises, do these shortfalls occur simultaneously or at 
different times in the 10-yr horizon?  Since either case could occur, we considered both cases in 
the scenario analyses. We did not ask the experts when a particular event could occur, but in all 
the assessments the experts were instructed to consider that the event could occur any time 
within the next 10 years and we assigned equal likelihoods for any period. On a period-by-period 
basis, the analyses assumed that if the shortfalls occurred simultaneously, the disruption sizes 
were added together.  However, if the shortfalls occurred at different times, then we assumed the 
largest of the shortfalls was relevant, and ignored the smaller sizes.  The chosen methodology 
does not account for the number of times a shortfall occurs in the horizon. 
 
SECTION 5.  EXPERT ASSESSMENTS 
Developing the simplified influence diagram in Figure 1 was an efficient method to 
reduce a highly complex risk assessment task into a manageable exercise.  With the influence 
diagram structure as a guide, the group of experts developed carefully worded scale definitions 
for each variable, and, through a group probability assessment exercise, achieved a consensus 
Duration Definition
Months Used 
in Analysis
Short 1-6 months 6
Long 6-18 months 12
Very Long > 18 months 24
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view on the probability appropriate for each level of the scale. The assessment was preceded by a 
discussion of probability assessment techniques, with special attention to the types of expert 
biases and mechanisms to minimize bias. 
 
The risk assessment required scale definitions and probability assessments on seven 
variable types:  global underlying events, regional factors, regional shortfall, regional duration, 
choke points, future oil production, and excess capacity.  Table 4 shows the entire set of 
variables assessed and are numbered according to the order in which they were assessed.  These 
inputs will be discussed in the next sections organized by variable type. 
 
Table 4.  Assessment Variables 
 
 
 
UNDERLYING EVENT SCALES AND PROBABILITIES 
 
The influence diagram of Figure 1 contains two underlying events: Middle East Conflict 
and Russia with West Conflict. For both underlying events and regional events, the influence 
diagram shows an influencing arc pointing into them from Oil Price Scenarios.  Later sections of 
Asssessment 
Order Assessment Variable Variable Type
1 Middle East Conflict Underlying Event
2 Saudi Internal Factors Internal Event
3 Other Persian Gulf Internal Factors Internal Event
4 Middle East Choke Points Choke Points
5 Saudi Shortfall Regional Shortfall
6 Saudi Duration Regional Duration
7 Saudi Offsets Excess Capacity
8 Other Persian Gulf Shortfall Regional Shortfall
9 Other Persian Gulf Duration Regional Duration
10 OPG Offsets Excess Capacity
11 Oil Price Scenarios Future Oil Production
12 Russia/West Conflict Underlying Event
13 Russia/Caspian Internal Factors Internal Event
14 Russia/Caspian Shortfall Regional Shortfall
15 Russia/Caspian Duration Regional Duration
16 Africa Internal Factors Internal Event
17 Africa Shortfall Regional Shortfall
18 Africa Duration Regional Duration
19 Latin America Internal Factors Internal Event
20 Latin America Shortfall Regional Shortfall
21 Latin America Duration Regional Duration
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this report describe these price scenarios. These three oil price scenarios (reference, low, and 
high) allowed experts to provide three different assessments depending upon the state of oil 
markets prior to a disruption. Lower oil prices might make some areas more vulnerable to greater 
geopolitical risks while higher oil prices might dampen these risks by providing greater financial 
stability within the country. Hence, there are three assessments (one for each oil price scenario) 
for both Middle East Conflict and Russia with West Conflict.  The underlying event scale 
definitions and probability assessments are in Tables 5 and 6.  Hybrid conflict in the second state 
for Russia with the West Conflict (Table 6) combines conventional warfare with irregular 
conflict including cyber warfare. 
 
Table 5.  Middle East Conflict: Scale and Probability Assignments 
 
 
 
Table 6.  Russia with West Conflict: Scale and Probability Assignments 
 
 
INTERNAL EVENT SCALES AND PROBABILITIES 
The influence diagram in Figure 1 contains five internal factors for each of the following 
regions in the risk assessment framework: 
 1  Middle East Conflict
Ref Pr Low Pr High Pr
5% 5% 15% 1. Minimal conflicts and relatively stable geopolitics (like prior to Arab Spring)
20% 20% 10% 2.
Domestic persistent unrest (political/religious/ethnic) in many Middle East and 
North Africa countries
35% 30% 35% 3.
Unrest in many middle east countries including strife with insurgent groups (like 
current)
25% 30% 20% 4.
Growing unrest/strife in many Middle Eastern countries combined with:
a) may or may not close key choke points, key facilities and/or
b) Coordinated supply reductions across countries (including embargoes or 
15% 15% 20% 5.
Interstate military conflict between standing governments in the Middle East
  a) may or may not close key choke points, key facilities, supply regions
  b) 2 or more countries: e.g. Saudi Arabia vs. Iran, Iran vs. Iraq, Russia vs. West, 
       possible U.S./Israeli involvement
Oil Price Scenarios
12  Russia with West Conflict
Ref Low Pr High Pr
1% 1% 1% 1. No conflict
74% 64% 64% 2. Only hybrid* conflict between Russia and any other nation (like current)
20% 30% 30% 3. Conflict between Russia and only Non-NATO Nation (s)
5% 5% 5% 4. Conflict between Russia and Nato Nation
Oil Price Scenarios
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1. Saudi Arabia 
2. Other Persian Gulf 
3. Africa 
4. Latin America 
5. Russia and Caspian States 
 
After the experts brainstormed a set of factors that could lead to an oil disruption, they 
organized them into factors that were unique to each region.  From these factors, regional 
influence diagrams were developed to represent the range of factors that could influence supply 
disruptions.  These regional influence diagrams, shown in Appendix B, served as the basis for 
developing 4 or 5-level constructed scales.  Each level on the scale described a state of the world 
for that region in the next 10 years, from most stable (level 1) to least stable (level 4 or 5).  The 
scales were created to be mutually exclusive and collectively exhausted, so that there would be 
no overlap between the scales and the scales covered the entire range of reasonable futures that 
could be anticipated.  When these criteria are met, the probabilities assigned to the levels on each 
scale will sum to 100%. 
 
As with the underlying events, the regional internal events are influenced by Oil Price 
Scenarios (reference, low, and high) and therefore there are three assessments for each of these 
internal events.  The internal event scale definitions and probability assessments are in Tables 7-
11. 
 
Table 7.  Saudi Internal Factors 
 
 
 2  Saudi Internal Factors
Ref Pr Low Pr High Pr
40% 30% 50% 1.
Continued acceptance of royal family, and insulation from regional instability, no 
major policy-driven outages, Aramco maintains high operating standards
20% 25% 15% 2. Major policy-driven temporary reduction in oil production
15% 15% 15% 3.
Significant but temporary infrastructure problem from attack or technical failure 
and/or isolated conflict that results in attacks on infrastructure without profound 
internal implications
15% 15% 15% 4.
Regional conflict with neighbors combined with internal political crisis, failed 
infrastructure  and/or sabotage which is difficult to fix
10% 15% 5% 5. Full domestic instability
Oil Price Scenarios
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Table 8.  Other Persian Gulf Internal Factors
 
 
 
Table 9.  Africa Internal Factors 
 
 
  
 3  Other Persian Gulf Internal Factors
Ref Pr Low Pr High Pr
35% 25% 45% 1.
Stable regional oil output, Iraq attracts sufficient investment, Iranian agreement 
holds, and no major policy-driven outages
10% 10% 5% 2. Major policy-driven temporary reduction in oil production
20% 25% 20% 3.
Significant but temporary infrastructure problem from attack or technical failure 
and/or isolated conflict that results in attacks on infrastructure without profound 
internal implications
20% 25% 15% 4.
One or more significant regional actors becomes failed states that disrupt 
production and exports
15% 15% 15% 5.
Regional conflict with neighbors combined with internal political crisis, failed 
infrastructure and/or sabotage which is difficult to fix, constraining access to Strait 
of Hormuz
Oil Price Scenarios
 16  Africa Internal Factors
Ref Pr Low Pr High Pr
5% 1% 15% 1.
Relative regional stability, limited small attacks/piracy/technical failures; 
countries/companies remain solvent; moderate labor unrest and operational 
accidents
70% 80% 70% 2.
In 1-2 countries, internal conflict and/or aggressive borderless entities targeting oil 
infrastructure (e.g., ISIS, MEND)
15% 4% 10% 3.
Interstate conflict between 2 countries with significant on shore production resulting 
in damaging assets (e.g., Libya, Egypt); fiscal failure of one or more countries 
and/or companies
10% 15% 5% 4.
Widespread unrest in large region (Arab Spring 2); widespread attacks against oil 
infrastructure; toppling of governments; failed state (s)
Oil Price Scenarios
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Table 10.  Latin America Internal Factors 
 
 
Table 11.  Russia and Caspian States Internal Factors 
 
 
 
SHORTFALL SCALES AND PROBABILITIES 
The amount of disruption of supply in each region could range from none to a complete 
disruption.  Although the amount of shortfall is a continuous variable, we approximated it as a 
discrete variable with four states, expressed as a fraction of that region’s supply.  To assist the 
experts in the assessment, we defined the four states using ranges to help them clarify their 
thoughts in the assessment exercise, and then simplified the ranges according to the percentages 
in Table 12. 
 19  Latin America Internal Factors
Ref Pr Low Pr High Pr
40% 1% 54% 1.
Relative regional stability; limited small attacks/technical failures; 
countries/companies remain solvent
50% 64% 40% 2.
Some sanctions imposed; disruptive labor unrest and substantial 
technical/operational accidents; fiscal challenges for national oil companies
5% 25% 5% 3.
Interstate conflict between 2 countries with significant on shore production resulting 
in damaging assets (e.g., Venezuela, Columbia) and/or fiscal failure of one or 
more countries and/or companies
5% 10% 1% 4.
Widespread unrest leading to region-wide Pan-American social upheaval; 
widespread attacks against oil infrastructure 
Oil Price Scenarios
 13  Russia & Caspian States Internal Factors
Ref Pr Low Pr High Pr
30% 15% 50% 1. Status quo; small isolated attacks
45% 50% 30% 2.
2-3 of the following:  voluntary production cuts; moderate transit disruptions; 
temporary disruptions from economic/political strife; sabotage /terminal attack
20% 30% 15% 3.
1-2 of the following:  Large cut-offs resulting from interstate conflict; collapse of a 
major Russian producer; succession crisis in Russia
5% 5% 5% 4. Major war or disruptions to transit; assumes ban on Russian oil would occur 
Oil Price Scenarios
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Table 12.  Shortfall Definitions 
 
        
 
To calculate the total size of a disruption, we multiplied the percent of supply disrupted 
by the study team’s 2020 estimate for production in the region disrupted.  We did not assess the 
specific time of a disruption, only whether a disruption occurs at any time in the 10-year period 
2016-2025.  The year 2020 was used as a representative year to estimate the amount of oil 
production at the time of a disruption. 
 
Estimating the probabilities for the shortfall scale in each region is complex and multi-
dimensional due to their conditioning events (see the influence diagram of Figure 1).  For 
example, the Saudi Shortfall variable has two arrows leading into it from Middle East Conflict 
and Saudi Internal Factors.  The Saudi Shortfall uncertainty requires multiple assessments, one 
for each combination of conditioning event states.  The details of the expert’s assessment can be 
found in Appendix C.  A summary of the shortfall amounts and probabilities by region, 
combining the individual conditioned assessments and the weighting of the underlying events, is 
shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  Percent of Supply Disrupted in All Regions 
 
For Saudi Arabia, this chart indicates that there is a 51% chance that no disruption will 
occur (taking all factors into account, including Saudi Internal Affairs and Middle East Conflict).  
Furthermore, the chance of a disruption of 10-30% of capacity is 39%, the chance of a medium-
Amount of 
Shortfall Definition
Percentage Used 
in Analysis
None None     (<10%) 0%
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All All     (>80%) 90%
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sized disruption (30-80% of capacity) is 8%, and the chance of a complete disruption of Saudi 
capacity is 2%.  
 
A similar interpretation can be read from the chart for the other four regions.  Latin 
America has the highest probability of no disruption (70%) and Africa the lowest (36%).  In 
Other Persian Gulf, Africa, and Latin America the chance for a complete disruption is nearly 
zero, and it is 1% and 2% in Russia and Saudi Arabia, respectively. 
DURATION SCALES AND PROBABILITIES 
The duration of a disruption could either be short (1-6 months), long (6-18 months), or 
very long (more than 18 months).  The experts believed that the duration of a disruption depends 
on both underlying events (Middle East Conflict and Russia with West Conflict) as well as 
internal events.  The influence diagram capturing key factors for oil disruption risks in Figure 1 
did not include this relationship to reduce complexity in the diagram.  The influence diagram of 
Figure 3 illustrates the relationships to establish the duration probabilities. 
 
Figure 3.  Influence Diagram Showing the Assessment for Duration of Disruption 
 
 
The top node in Figure 3 is Choke Duration and will be described in the next section.  For 
the 5 regions in our study, Saudi, OPG, and Russia have 2 influencing arrows pointing to the 
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duration events, while Africa and Latin America have 1 influencing arrow.  The experts were 
asked to identify the probability of a disruption being restored within six months, within 18 
months, or beyond 18 months.  For the 3 regions with 2 influencing arrows, the experts provided 
unique probabilities depending on the states of the predecessor nodes.  For example, Figure 4 
identifies 25 possible states that reflect these interrelationships for Saudi Arabia.  The columns 
represent the 5 possible states for Saudi internal conditions, and the rows represent the 5 possible 
states of the entire Middle East region.  Each of the 25 cells in the five-by-five matrix requires a 
distinct probability distribution for short, long, and very long disruptions.   
 
To simplify the assessment task for Saudi and Other Persian Gulf, the 25 distinct 
scenarios were classified into three groups, with each group being treated as having a similar 
likelihood of duration.  Group A is characterized by mostly shorter disruptions, Group C by 
longer disruptions, and Group B by a mixture of short and long durations.  The probability 
assignments for each group are shown in Figure 5.  A similar structure for Other Persian Gulf is 
shown in Figures 6 and 7.  The Russia-Caspian region has 16 distinct scenarios as each of its 
predecessor nodes had 4 states.  For this region, as well as the Africa and Latin America, rather 
than create groups, we asked the experts for their distributions directly for each conditioning 
event. 
 
Figure 4.  Group Assignments for Saudi Duration 
 
 
Figure 5.  Disruption Duration Probabilities for Saudi 
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Figure 6.  Group Assignments for Other Persian Gulf Duration  
 
 
Figure 7.  Disruption Duration Probabilities for Other Persian Gulf 
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 The durations for Africa, Latin America, and Russia are less complex which allowed for 
the duration probabilities to be assessed directly.  For Africa and Latin America they are 
conditioned on the internal factors for that region and are shown in Figures 8 and 9.  For Russia 
and Caspian States, they depend on both internal factors and the underlying event “Russia with 
West Conflict” and are shown in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 8.  Disruption Duration Probabilities for Africa 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.  Disruption Duration Probabilities for Latin America 
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Figure 10.  Disruption Duration Probabilities for Russia and Caspian States 
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CHOKE POINTS 
Conflicts which restrict shipping lanes can lead to a significant disruption.  The experts 
discussed four possible choke points and their likelihood of leading to a significant disruption.  
After discussion and simplification, they agreed to consider only one choke point, the Strait of 
Hormuz, as a significant source of disruption.  Although the Straight currently sees 17 MMBD of 
crude oil through these shipping lanes, the experts believed that Saudi Arabia can easily divert 
close to 2.8 MMBD of crude oil through the East-West Pipeline to bypass Hormuz.  The group 
limited the largest disruption size possible to 8 MMBD because the producers could find other 
means of diverting the oil.  A partial disruption of 4 MMBD is also a possibility, so the scale for 
a Middle East Choke Point through the Strait of Hormuz is 0, 4, and 8 MMBD, respectively. 
 
The likelihood of a choke point disruption depends on the state of Middle East Conflict.  
With minimal conflict, the experts believed that there was virtually no possibility for a choke 
point disruption as shown in Figure 11.  With levels 2-4 on the Middle East Conflict scale, the 
probability of a choke point disruption is very low.  However, with a level 5 on this scale, where 
the Middle East has interstate conflicts between standing governments, the probability of a 4 
MMBD and 8 MMBD disruption is 60% and 20%, respectively. 
 
The amount of total oil flowing through the Strait of Hormuz is approximately 7 MMBD 
from Saudi Arabia and 10 MMBD from Other Persian Gulf.  Known offsets that are likely be 
used are approximately 2.8 MMBD within Saudi Arabia through the East-West Pipeline and 0.9 
MMBD in the United Arab Emirates via the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline.2 After excluding 
these offsets, the Saudi Arabian net flows through this choke point were 32% of the total and the 
Other Persian Gulf net flows were 68%. We assumed that if a choke point disruption occurs, the 
disruption will be from both regions proportionally.   
 
An important assumption for incorporating a choke point disruption into the overall risk 
assessment is the connection with shortfalls in Saudi Arabia and Other Persian Gulf.  It is 
possible that both a choke point disruption and a regional disruption occur simultaneously, but if 
the regional disruption is severe it is likely that there will be no choke point disruption since very 
little oil will be flowing through the shipping lanes.  To avoid double counting, if Saudi or Other 
Persian Gulf has a shortfall of “Medium” (50% of production) or “All” (90% of production) then 
the choke point disruption will not occur.  For all other situations, the choke point disruptions are 
added to the shortfall amounts consistent with the logic for adding shortfall amounts from the 
five regions in the study3. 
 
For choke point durations, the experts believe that the large choke point disruption of 8 
MMBD would be either short or long at 50% probabilities, but never very long.  For a 4 MMBD 
choke point disruption, they assigned a 75% probability to a short duration and 25% to a long 
duration. 
 
                                                 
2 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “World Oil Transit Chokepoints,” November 2014, 
http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.cfm?RegionTopicID=WOTC. 
3 The logic for adding shortfalls across regions relied on the assumption that if a shortfall occurred, it was equally 
likely to be at any time during the 10-year period. 
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Figure 11.  Choke Point Probabilities based on Middle East Conflict 
 
 
EXCESS CAPACITY SCALES AND PROBABILILITES 
If a disruption of oil supplies occurs, it may be offset completely or partially by excess 
capacity.  The experts agreed that significant excess capacity is only available from Saudi Arabia 
and Other Persian Gulf sources.  Saudi excess capacity could be between 0.5 and 2 MMBD 
while Other Persian Gulf would have only 0.5 MMBD.  The experts provided estimates on 
likelihoods of various amounts available at the time of a disruption as shown in Table 13. 
 
Excess capacity is only available to offset disruptions if the internal affairs in that region 
are stable.  Furthermore, none would be available if that region was experiencing a disruption.  
Taking into account this logic, combined with the probability inputs in Table 13, we can 
compute the probability distribution on excess capacity available (Figure 12).  The stair step line 
in this figure is the probability of having this amount of spare capacity or more.  The vertical line 
at 0.4 MMBD is the probability-weighted average of all possible amounts of excess capacity 
available. 
 
Table 13.  Excess Capacity Amount and Likelihood 
 
0 4MMBD 8 MMBD
100% 0% 0% 1. Minimal conflicts and relatively stable geopolitics (like prior to Arab Spring)
99% 1% 0% 2.
Domestic persistent unrest (political/religious/ethnic) in many Middle East and North 
Africa countries
95% 5% 0% 3. Unrest in many middle east countries including strife with insurgent groups (like current)
85% 14% 1% 4.
Growing unrest/strife in many Middle Eastern countries combined with:
a) may or may not close key choke points, key facilities and/or
b) Coordinated supply reductions across countries (including embargoes or sanctions)
20% 60% 20% 5.
Interstate military conflict between standing governments in the Middle East
  a) may or may not close key choke points, key facilities, supply regions
  b) 2 or more countries: e.g. Saudi Arabia vs. Iran, Iran vs. Iraq, Russia vs. West, 
       possible U.S./Israeli involvement
Choke
Saudi Excess Capacity 
MMBD Probability MMBD Probability 
0 25% 0 85% 
0.5 5% 0.5 15% 
1 25% 
1.5 25% 
2 20% 
Other Persian Gulf Excess Capacity 
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Figure 12.  Probability Distribution of Net Excess Capacity Available 
 
OIL PRODUCTION SCENARIOS AND PROBABILITIES 
A number of assessments depended on the state of the oil market as characterized by a 
low, reference, or high price scenario.  The experts did not seek to arrive at a consensus view 
regarding the validity or probability of oil price forecasts, as this discussion is outside the scope 
of the oil disruption risk assessment.  We did, however, help the experts think about how their 
assessment of risks might change for different oil price paths. In making their baseline 
assessments, experts thought about a price path that recovered gradually from their recent levels 
after the 2014 oil price collapse. As an alternative, we asked them to think about a high oil price 
path where they recovered more quickly from these levels. A third alternative called the low 
price case allowed them an opportunity to evaluate risks when the recovery in oil prices was 
much more modest. The oil price scenarios were qualitative guidelines rather than precise 
numerical forecasts. Within the 10-year risk assessment time frame 2016-2025, we chose the 
year 2020 as a representative year for all three oil production scenarios (Table 14).  Although we 
did not ask the experts to evaluate the likelihood that each oil price case would exist, reporting 
our results about overall risks requires that some probabilities be assigned. The study group 
organizers assigned probabilities of 30%, 40%, and 30% to the high, reference, and low price 
scenarios, respectively.   
Table 14.  Oil Production Scenarios 
 
Reference Low Price High Price
World 97.62 99.40 94.81
Middle East 27.12 30.38 22.59
Saudi Arabia 11.62 13.02 9.68
Other Persian Gulf 15.49 17.36 12.91
Africa 8.50 9.25 7.64
Latin America 6.06 6.05 5.93
Russia & Caspian 13.89 13.77 14.60
Other 42.05 39.94 44.06
OPEC Share 28% 31% 24%
World Price ($/B) 97 69 150
Production 2020 (MMBD)
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SECTION 6.  RESULTS 
 The detailed probability data obtained from the experts are listed in Appendix C.  This 
information was entered into DPL software,4 a state-of-the-art decision and risk analysis 
package.  To obtain summary information, we calculated the disruption size for all combinations 
of event states (millions of scenarios) and weighted each scenario by its likelihood of occurrence. 
 
Figure 13.  Probability of an Oil Disruption Lasting 1-6 Months 
 
 
The scenario-probability pairs are summarized and displayed in an Excess Probability graph 
shown for all disruptions in Figure 13.  The curve plots the probability that a disruption will 
occur in the next 10 years of at least x, for each value of x (in MMBD, net of offsets) on the 
horizontal axis.  For example, the data point at 5 MMBD and 42% can be described as a 42% 
chance that a 5 MMBD disruption or larger will occur at least one time in the 10-year time frame 
2016-2025.  It is very likely that a disruption greater than 2 MMBD will occur (81%).  However, 
it is unlikely that disruptions greater than 15 MMBD will occur (1%).  This curve allows one to 
easily identify the likelihood of disruption sizes within a range.  For example, the probability of a 
disruption between 5-10 MMBD is 34% (probability of >5 is 42%, probability of >10 is 8%, 
difference is 42%-8% = 34%).   The graph shows a larger weighting for the range between 2-8 
MMBD by the steep drop in the curve in these regions. 
 
The distribution in Figure 13 is a combination of events in each of five regions.  We can 
examine the contribution of each region to the overall distribution by showing the results for one 
region at a time, assuming no disruptions in the other regions.  Figures 14-16 shows each region 
                                                 
4 DPL decision tree and influence diagram software by Syncopation Software 
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independently on the same excess probability graph.  Other Persian Gulf and Africa regions have 
the larger probabilities of disruption (for disruptions less than 1 MMBD) than Latin America or 
Russian and Caspian States.  Saudi Arabia is in the middle at about 50% chance that some oil 
will be disrupted. The probability of any disruption and the probability of 2 MMBD or greater 
disruption are summarized in Table 15. 
 
Table 15.  Probability of a Disruption by Region 
 
 
 
Figure 14.  Comparison of Short-Duration Disruptions by Region 
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Figure 15.  Comparison of Long-Duration Disruptions by Region 
 
 
 
Figure 16.  Comparison of Very Long-Duration Disruptions by Region 
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Figure 17.  Probability of a Disruption for All Durations 
 
Combining all regions together, we can show all three durations on the same curve 
(Figure 17), providing a concise and powerful graphic that summarizes the magnitude, 
likelihood, and duration of oil disruption risks.  Alternatively, the regional and combined 
probabilities of a disruption of at least 2 MMBD can be displayed in tabular format (Table 16), 
which highlights that Other Persian Gulf is the most significant contributor to overall risk for a 
disruption of any duration. 
 
Table 16.  Probability of a Disruption > 2 MMBD by Region and Duration  
 
 
The distributions in Figures 14-16 compare regional probability distributions by duration.  
We can also contrast the durations of a disruption for each region as shown in Figure 18.  For the 
Russia/Caspian States, the shorter duration disruptions are much more likely than longer 
durations.  The likelihood of very long durations in Other Persian Gulf are at least double that of 
other regions.  Figure 19 summarizes the proportion of short, long, and very long disruptions by 
each region. 
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Figure 18.  Probability of a Disruption by Region for Each Duration 
 
Figure 19.  Comparison of Duration Probabilities by Region 
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 A sensitivity analysis testing the impact of offsets to the risk assessment is shown in 
Figure 20.  With no excess capacity, a flat region between 0-2 MMBD represents a near certainty 
that a disruption of this magnitude will occur in the next 10 years.  The effect of including excess 
capacity tends to shift the distribution to the left by roughly 2/3 MMBD, which represents the 
average of the amount of excess capacity available. 
 
Figure 20.  Sensitivity to Removing Excess Capacity  
 
  
We examined the sensitivity to Middle East conflict, as it was believed that an underlying 
event affecting multiple regions together may have a significant impact on disruption risks.  
Figure 21 contrasts the current state in the Middle East (Unrest in many Middle Eastern countries 
including strife with insurgent groups) with two separate cases representing the extreme 
conditions in the Middle East:  stable conditions like prior to the Arab Spring, and interstate 
military conflict between standing governments of two or more countries.  At 5 MMBD or 
greater, the probability varied from 26% under stable conditions to 64% under interstate conflict 
conditions, confirming the notion that middle east events and their linkages to the regional 
shortfall risks are an important element of the oil risk assessment.  
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Figure 21.  Sensitivity to Middle East Conflict Event 
 
In the prior risk assessment, oil price scenarios were used to estimate different production 
amounts which were then multiplied by the percent shortfall to determine the disruption size.  In 
this assessment, oil price scenarios took a more significant role in estimating probabilities for 
internal factors and underlying events.  Figure 22 shows the sensitivity of the three oil price 
scenarios to the overall probability of a disruption.   Higher oil prices result from lower 
production amounts from the five relatively unstable regions evaluated in this study. In addition, 
they lower probabilities of a disruption relative to the reference price scenario.  The opposite 
trend occurs for the low price scenario.  At 5 MMBD, the probabilities vary from 28% to 55%, 
showing that changes in oil price can alter the viewpoint about oil disruption risks. Lower oil 
price paths make net disruptions of any given size more likely.  
 
Figure 22.  Sensitivity to Oil Price Scenario 
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SECTION 7.  COMPARISON WITH PRIOR STUDIES 
Besides the current study, four formal oil disruption risk assessments have been 
conducted in the past 25 years for the purposes of SPR sizing considerations:  the 1990 DOE 
Interagency study relying on statistical parameter estimation, the 1996 and 2005 EMF studies 
incorporating expert judgment and decision analytic methods, and the 1999 CIA-hosted 
workshop.  Refer to the risk assessment alternatives comparison paper by Leiby/Bowman for 
further details on the approaches.  In this section, we will compare the 2005 EMF study with the 
current 2015 EMF study, both of which rely on the same underlying methodology and processes.  
The DOE sponsors specifically requested the EMF to sponsor this risk assessment due to their 
interest in how the change in world events have influenced the conclusions of the 2005 EMF 
study, and because of their belief in the validity and usefulness of the approach. 
 
In general, this panel of energy security experts has concluded that current world events 
and energy markets have increased the likelihood of oil disruptions since 1996 but demonstrated 
a similar risk profile compared to the 2005 period. The probability of a disruption in the current 
study is very modestly lower than in 2005 for disruptions less than 7 MMBD. The likelihood of a 
disruption for 7 MMBD or more is roughly equivalent in the two studies.   
 
We start by discussing changes in scope of the two studies, then compare and contrast the 
key inputs on event probabilities, shortfall probabilities, duration probabilities, and excess 
capacity estimates.  We conclude with a discussion of overall results and a comparison with the 
1996 risk assessment. 
 
In the 2005 study, experts identified four regions that had significant risk of disruptions: 
Saudi, Other Persian Gulf, West of Suez, and Russia and Caspian States.  In this study, there are 
five regions since the West of Suez region was split into Africa and Latin America.  All other 
regions included the same countries with the exception that Mexico was added to West of Suez 
(now Latin America).  Furthermore, an explicit consideration of choke points was added to the 
current framework and treated as a significant source of oil disruption risks. 
 
Each study considered Middle East Conflict as a key underlying event that conditioned 
both Saudi and OPG internal assessments.  The 2015 study also added Russia with West Conflict 
as a second underlying event, which was used to support the assessment for Russia and Caspian 
states regional factors, but did not have an effect on other regions.  The scales for internal events 
for each study had four or five levels, but their definitions were adjusted to reflect current world 
conditions and, ultimately, to yield a higher quality probability estimate because experts could 
more easily link their judgment to current perspectives.  For example, Level 1 for Middle East 
Conflict in 2005 was “No conflict (any existing conflict ending quickly)” while in 2015 it is 
“Minimal conflicts and relatively stable geopolitics (like prior to Arab Spring).”  For Level 2, the 
experts defined the scale in 2005 as “Limited war, including active insurgent operations, e.g., 
Arab/Iran - Israeli War” but the 2015 assessment has a Level 2 defined as “Domestic persistent 
unrest (political/religious/ethnic) in many Middle East and North Africa countries.”  Although 
there are five levels for each study, both the descriptions of each level and the probabilities 
assigned to them have changed.  The comparison of the likelihood of particular states between 
the two studies is seen in Table 17. 
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For both 2005 and 2015, stability in the Middle East is defined as either a level 1 or level 
2 on the scale, even though there are variations in the scale definitions.  The probability of 
stability in the Middle East has decreased 29% from 54% to 25%, assuming “No conflict and 
Limited Arab-Israeli war” are considered stable for Middle East Conflict in 2005 and “Minimal 
conflict and Growing domestic unrest” are stable for 2015.  The probability of stable internal 
affairs for Saudi and Other Persian Gulf has remained about the same (35% - 43%).  The 
probability of policy-driven reductions in Saudi has doubled over the past 10 years to 20%.   The 
probability of stable internal affairs in Russia and the Caspian States has also remained 
consistent at about 70%, but interstate conflict has increase from 10% to 28%.   Figure 23 shows 
a graphical comparison of stability probabilities, and for this viewpoint we have included the 
data from the 1996 study when relevant.  On this figure, the two regions that replaced the West 
of Suez region from 2005 (Africa and Latin America) are shown on the far right.  Also shown is 
the Russia with West conflict.  All three of these bars have no basis to compare with prior 
studies. 
 
Table 17.  Comparison of Event Probabilities with Prior Studies5 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 The scale definitions between the 2005 and 2015 assessments are similar but not identical, so caution should be 
used in making a direct comparison between the two studies. 
1 No conflict 5% 1 Minimal conflict 8%
2 Limited Arab-Israeli war 49% 2 Growing domestic unrest 17%
3 Spillover to unrest 15% 3 Growing political unrest 34%
4 Limited war oil producer 21% 4 Limited interstate unrest 25%
5 Extended active war 10% 5 Wider-spread interstate conflict 16%
1 Stable 40% 1 Stable 39%
2 Stable with cutback 10% 2 Major policy-driven reduction 21%
3 Insurgency-intermittent disruptions 30% 3 Tech failure or isolated conflict 15%
4 Saudi hostile to West 15% 4 Reg conflict with internal crisis 15%
5 Civil war - failed state 5% 5 Full social rev;  curtail exports 11%
1 Stable except Iraq 23% 1 Stable 34%
2 Stable except Iraq with cutback 12% 2 Major policy-driven reduction 9%
3 Civil war or succession in 1 country 50% 3 Tech failure or isolated conflict 22%
4 Civil war or succession in 2 countries 15% 4 Failed states 21%
5 Regional conflict w/ internal crisis 15%
1 Stable 63% 1 Status quo; small isolated attacks 30%
2 Stable with cutback 7% 2 voluntary production cuts; strife 43%
3 Terror attack on facility 20% 3 Interstate conflict; Russia suc crisis 23%
4 Insurgency or border conflict 10% 4 Major war; ban on Russian oil 5%
Russia Internal Factors 2005 Russia Internal Factors 2015
Middle East Conflict 2005 Middle East Conflict 2015
Saudi Internal Factors 2005 Saudi Internal Factors 2015
OPG Internal Factors 2005 OPG Internal Factors 2015
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Figure 23.  Comparison of Probability of Stability 
 
The size of shortfall was estimated by the expert panel by assigning probabilities to four 
states (No Shortfall, Small 10-30%, Medium 30-80%, All >80%). They did this under various 
conditioning event assumptions (internal events and underlying events).  The summary results 
are expressed in the bar chart of Figure 24.  There is remarkable similarity in Saudi Arabia 
between 2005 and 2015.  There is a 50% probability of no shortfall for both.  The probability of 
disrupting all of Saudi production dropped from 4% in 2005 to 2% in 2015.  For Other Persian 
Gulf, the probability of No shortfall or a small shortfall is 80%-85%, while the probability of no 
shortfall increased from 11% to 38%.  In 2005, experts provided a 2% probability of all of Other 
Persian Gulf facilities to be disrupted, and in 2015 that probability has dropped to nearly 0%.  
Russia and Caspian region showed a decrease in no shortfall from 74% to 60%. 
 
Figure 24.  Comparison of Shortfall Size 
 
 
Today’s excess capacity estimates have decreased by about half of the levels from 2005.  
Even though the experts limited the Saudi excess capacity to no more than 2 MMBD (in 2005 
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there was a small probability of 3 and 5 MMBD), there is a higher likelihood of small amounts 
of excess capacity available. This assessment by the current group of experts results in the 
overall average for Saudi Arabia to decrease from about 1.7 MMBD in the 2005 assessment to 
1.1 MMBD available in the current study.  The only other region in which excess capacity could 
be available is Other Persian Gulf, and it only provides a negligible amount relative to Saudi 
Arabia. Other Persian Gulf spare capacity has also decreased since 2005. The net effect of excess 
capacity available, computed by taking the probability-weighted average of all amounts, is 
roughly 1.1 MMBD available for both regions, down from 2.1 MMBD for both regions in 2005.  
The changes in excess capacity are summarized in Table 18.  As in prior studies, we did not 
include private stock.  The full cumulative probability distribution for excess capacity in Figure 
25 shows the comparison of effective excess capacity for the two studies. 
 
Table 18.  Comparison of Probability of Excess Capacity 
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Figure 25.  Comparison of Effective Excess Capacity 
 
 As discussed in the Results section, Russia and Caspian states have a much higher 
likelihood for shorter disruptions, while Other Persian Gulf states tend to have longer 
disruptions.  In 2005, this same trend occurs as shown in Figure 26, with slightly smaller chances 
for very long disruptions compared to the current study. 
 
Figure 26.  Comparison of Duration Probabilities 
 
The net effect of these changes (splitting West of Suez into two regions, adding choke 
points, updating event and shortfall duration probabilities, modifying excess capacity) is shown 
in Figures 27 and 28. The probability of a disruption in the current study is roughly 0% to 5% 
lower than in 2005 depending on the size of disruption considered.  The probability of a 
disruption for 7 MMBD or more is roughly equivalent in the two studies.  For the 1996 study, no 
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direct comparison is possible with disruptions lasting longer than 18 months as only 2 durations 
were considered.  For a more equitable comparison to the 1996 study in Figure 28, we only 
allowed disruptions in Saudi and Other Persian Gulf.  In this comparison, the probability of any 
disruption in 2005 and 2015 has doubled since the 1996 study, while the probability of a 3 
MMBD and 8 MMBD disruption is equivalent for all three periods (35% and 10%, respectively).   
Figure 27.  Comparison of Probability of Disruption for Three Study Periods 
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Figure 28.  Comparison of Probability of Disruption for Saudi and Other Persian Gulf only 
 
SECTION 8.  SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE ASSESSMENTS 
When assessing risks that are broad in their complexity, contentious in their implications, 
and highly subjective, it is critically important to engage a group of experts in a dialogue format 
and assess their collective judgment.  The EMF oil disruption risk assessment took this approach, 
and thereby overcame some of the shortcomings of empirical analyses and modeling, and the 
tendency to focus on a large amount of detail for a limited set of issues.  Many statistical 
approaches presume that the future behaves much like the past, a potentially limiting viewpoint. 
 
The current framework for the assessment had some important benefits that we 
recommend for future assessments and updates.  In only two meetings that were a month apart, 
we efficiently structured the scope of the assessment, defined variable definitions and scales, and 
developed inputs for 21 uncertain variables covering over 500 probability inputs.  The concise 
tree-based algorithm employed allowed for the computation and integration of millions of 
combinations of scenarios, with quick updating, intuitive accounting for complex dependencies, 
and clear outputs to policymakers.  By inviting experts from a wide array of geopolitical and 
industry perspectives, the current analyses proved to be an efficient synthesis of complex issues, 
capturing and documenting the logic and assumptions from multiple sources in a consistent 
framework.  The structured interview and probability elicitation methods helped to minimize 
bias, promote communication among experts and study sponsors, and encourage an appropriate 
interaction among experts to calibrate results. 
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Can this study be repeated or revisited in the future?  By building on the framework and 
methodology from the 1996 and 2005 studies, we demonstrated that a quality risk assessment 
could be repeated at minimal cost and time, even over a significant time gap and with new 
experts participating.  We did have a small number of experts that participated in two and some 
in all three EMF studies, which proved very useful and promoted a more efficient dialogue and 
discussion about the inputs.  The framework allows for a quick update of oil disruption risks if a 
few key events change while most of the geopolitical issues are similar.  In this case, it would 
only require a short discussion with a few key experts, and prove particularly valuable in the 
near-term (1-3 years).  In the long-term or with significant changes to energy security events, we 
recommend a similar format with two separate meetings with a diversity of experts that are 
conducted 2-4 weeks apart. 
 
The energy security workshops were successful in verifying the risk assessment 
framework and updating the inputs to reflect current conditions. The quantification of the risks of 
oil disruptions opens the door to a variety of extensions of the framework.  For example, the 
rigorous and proven standards of decision analysis reflect its suitability for use in policy 
decisions. The framework could be extended to analyze strategic decisions including stockpile 
releases and other types of strategic alternatives that could mitigate the impacts of oil 
disruptions.  The analysis and methods could also be employed on SPR sizing decisions.  
Another important extension would be to organize other expert groups and apply the same 
methodology to other critical events that could cause major oil supply disruptions. Experts 
frequently mentioned cyber security, pandemics, extreme weather and earthquakes that could 
arise in both geopolitically stable and unstable regions. Including these evaluations would 
provide a more thorough evaluation of the potential risks to world oil supplies. 
 
SECTION 9.  CONCLUSIONS 
The Energy Modeling Forum at Stanford University has conducted the third assessment 
of future oil disruption risks in the past 20 years, each time drawing upon a common framework 
that has been updated to account for current geopolitical conditions relevant to significant oil 
disruptions.  Recent changes in world events, tensions in other parts of the world, and energy 
markets (oil price decreases), along with the dramatic surge in North American tight oil supplies 
from shale formations have renewed interest by the Department of Energy (DOE) and other 
parties in understanding the risk of major oil disruptions.  The current risk assessment was 
conducted through a series of two workshops in September and October of 2015 which were 
attended by leading geopolitical, military and oil-market experts who provided their expertise on 
the probability of different events occurring, and their corresponding link to major disruptions in 
key oil market regions.  Special attention was made to differentiate disruptions by their 
magnitude, by their likelihood of occurrence, and by whether they are short-, long-, or very long-
term in duration. 
 
The world oil market was divided into 5 primary regions of production:  Saudi Arabia, 
Other Persian Gulf, Africa, Latin America, and Russian / Caspian States.  Taken together these 
regions account for 57% of the world production of 98 MMBD (as projected by the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration for 2020).  The panel of experts also considered choke point 
disruptions at vulnerable shipping lanes.  Not included in the assessment were disruptions from 
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the US market and smaller global producers.  Excess capacity was considered as a source to 
mitigate oil disruptions and therefore a primary output of the assessment is “Net Disruptions” or 
the total disruption less the excess capacity available. 
  
The final results of the risk assessment convey a range of insights across the three 
dimensions of magnitude, likelihood, and length of a disruption.  
 
Table 19.  Probability of a Disruption by Size, Duration, and Region 
 
 
  
In the 2005 study, experts identified four regions that had significant risk of disruptions: 
Saudi, Other Persian Gulf, West of Suez, and Russia and Caspian States.  In this study, there are 
five regions since the West of Suez region was split into Africa and Latin America.  All other 
regions included the same countries with the exception that Mexico was added to West of Suez 
(now Latin America).  Furthermore, an explicit consideration of choke points was added to the 
current framework and treated as a significant source of oil disruption risks.  The net effect of 
these changes results in a very similar probability of disruption for up to 4 MMBD and greater 
than 7 MMBD.  Between 4-7 MMBD, the probability of a disruption in the current study is 
roughly 5% lower than in 2005   
 
In general, this panel of energy security expert has concluded that current world events 
and energy markets have increased the likelihood of oil disruptions since 1996 but demonstrated 
a similar risk profile compared to the 2005 period. Moreover, their assessments indicate that 
lower oil price paths make net disruptions of any given size more likely. 
> 0 MMBD > 2 MMBD > 3 MMBD > 5 MMBD
DURATION
Short 96% 80% 67% 42%
Long 82% 63%
Very Long 53% 37%
REGION
Africa 62%
Other Persian Gulf 61%
Saudi Arabia 48%
Russian / Caspian States 40%
Latin America 28%
Probability of a Disruption:
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SECTION 10.  APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A:  METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW 
 Decision analysis is a set of analytical methods and organizational processes for 
improved decision-making.  For the purposes of this study, a distinguishing feature of decision 
analysis is especially important:  a formal treatment of uncertainty.  Empirical data is often 
insufficient to quantify the uncertainty in the consequences faced by a decision or policymaker.  
Using standard methods of Bayesian probability theory, decision analysis provides a formal 
quantitative procedure for extracting and quantifying the subjective uncertainty of experts, and 
for revising and updating the assessments as new information becomes available.  
 
This project is employing the decision analysis framework, which relies on a structured 
and thorough modeling methodology, together with the direct elicitation of probabilities from a 
panel of experts.  Other approaches have been used, such as statistical analyses of historical 
frequencies and indirect methods (e.g., scenario analyses and risk indices). 
 
 “Risk” is defined as uncertainty regarding future adverse consequences.  To illustrate the 
approach taken in this study, consider an example of one adverse consequence:  a 10 MMBD 
shortfall in production for six months in 2022.  Risk assessment serves to determine what the 
possible adverse consequences could be and their probabilities of occurring.  It is the process of 
quantifying the chances of all possible outcomes.  The probability distributions used to describe 
the uncertainty about adverse consequences can be obtained through historical records, through 
direct assessments from experts when historical information is insufficient, or using a 
combination of the two approaches.   
 
 The decision analysis approach to capturing judgmental uncertainty is to model the 
assessed quantity in detail by decomposing it into well-defined components, assessing lower 
level probabilities, and then combining the data mathematically.  Advantages of this approach 
are 1) assessments are easier, 2) it facilitates assessments with groups of experts, 3) the quality of 
assessments tends to be high, and 4) logic and assumptions are well documented.  Disadvantages 
are a tendency to go too far in the level of detail of modeling the problem, and the approach can 
be time intensive. 
 
 Probability assessments can be viewed as a quantitative representation of a person’s 
knowledge.  To ensure that probability assessments obtained from experts are authentic and 
reliable, formal procedures have been developed and were incorporated in this study.  These 
include training on the types of biases people exhibit when facing uncertainty, interview 
techniques to control motivational or cognitive biases, and methods to assess multiple experts 
and resolve differences in opinion. 
 
 This risk assessment relied on influence diagrams to support the structuring and 
organizing of the complex relationships between events that lead to oil disruptions.  The 
influence diagram is a useful tool, which provides a roadmap for the probability assessment 
process and which helps to communicate the model framework to everyone involved in the 
process.  Generally, an influence diagram is a graphical representation of a decision or risk 
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analysis problem.  Each uncertain event in an influence diagram has 2 or more states which are 
mutually exclusive (non-overlapping) and collectively exhaustive (all possibilities included), and 
each state has an associated likelihood.  An arrow pointing to an uncertainty represents 
probabilistic dependence. 
 
 We will use a simplified example of an influence diagram applied to the oil disruption 
problem to illustrate the meaning of the various elements, the data required for the analysis, and 
the computations that produce the resulting probability distributions. 
 
 Let us begin by looking at an uncertain event, expressed as a circle or oval.  Figure A1 
shows an event, which captures the uncertainty surrounding the size of a shortfall in oil 
production in Saudi Arabia. 
 
Figure A.1.  Example of an Uncertain Event 
 
 
Uncertain events in an influence diagram have a precise meaning.  Because its value is 
unknown to the decision maker, an uncertain event must have two or more states.  Furthermore, 
the states must be mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive so that the probabilities 
assigned to each state sum to 100% and are consistent in their representation of the parameter 
under consideration.  Figure A1 shows the states of the uncertain event “Size of Saudi Shortfall.” 
 
There are 2 branches because the uncertain event is characterized by two states.  By 
convention, the name of the state is placed above the branch, and the probability associated with 
that state below the branch.  The mutual exclusivity condition means that the states may not 
overlap.  For example, in Figure A1 we could not have the following two states since they 
overlap: 
– Less than 1/4 capacity 
– More than 10% of capacity. 
 
The two states both include capacity losses between 10% and 25% of total capacity. 
Furthermore, the collectively exhaustive condition means that all possibilities must be included.  
In Figure A1, we could not have the states 
– Less than 1/4 capacity 
– More than 1/2 capacity 
No disruption 
5 MMBD 
Size of
Saudi
Shortfall
Size of
Saudi
Shortfall
0.8
0.2
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since we have not included disruption sizes between 1/4 and 1/2 of capacity.  Finally, each state 
of an event is assigned a likelihood of occurring, and from the above conditions, the sum of the 
likelihoods must equal one. 
 
 An event with no predecessors, that is, no arrows pointing to it in the influence diagram, 
is an independent variable.  The probability assignments provided by the experts for this event 
are independent of any other factors or variables.  However, dependencies among events often 
dominate the results of a risk analysis, and therefore careful attention is given to specifying and 
quantifying the degree of dependence among events.  Figure A2 shows an event (Middle East 
Conflict) that influences the size of a Saudi shortfall. 
 
Figure A.2.  Example of Probability Assignments for Dependent Events 
 
 
 
An arrow pointing to an uncertainty represents probabilistic dependence.  In this case, the 
probability assignments for Size of Saudi Shortfall depend on whether there is instability or not 
in the Middle East.  It is very important to capture these types of dependencies in a risk 
assessment. 
 
 The development of an influence diagram involves identifying events, deciding on 
appropriate states for each event, determining the dependencies among events, and assigning 
likelihoods to the states of each event.  Once these steps are accomplished, we are ready to 
perform the analysis that will compute the resulting probability distribution on any variable of 
interest.  For this study, the primary variable of interest is Net Disruptions.  We will use another 
simplified example to show how the calculations are performed. 
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Figure A.3.  Sample Influence Diagram  
 
 
 Figure A3 shows two independent events that influence the computation of the value 
“Net Disruption.”  The equation for net disruption is: 
 
 Net Disruption = Max (0, Size of Saudi Shortfall – Offsets) 
 
 Suppose that Size of Saudi Shortfall is defined with three states (None, Moderate, All) 
and the Offsets event with two states (None, High).  To perform the risk assessment, it is 
necessary to examine all combinations of all event states.  For this simple example, we have six 
scenarios as shown in Figure A4.  The probabilities are shown beneath each branch on the 
probability tree. 
 
 For each scenario, we compute the joint probability by multiplying the probabilities on 
the branches.  We also compute the Net Disruption for each branch by invoking the equation 
above.  Then, with probability value pairs for each branch, we can plot the probability density 
function to summarize the impacts and likelihoods of all possible scenarios (top of Figure A5). 
 
Figure A.4.  Probability Tree for Performing Risk Assessment Computations 
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Figure A.5.  Probability Density and Cumulative Distribution Function for "Net 
Disruption" 
 
The probability density function shows the probability of a scenario as the height of the 
line for a given net disruption.  With more scenarios, these functions may look like bell-shaped 
curves in a normal or lognormal shape.  The cumulative probability distribution is a much more 
useful representation of the same result.  Figure A5 also shows the distribution in cumulative 
form.  For a given value of net disruption on the horizontal axis, the corresponding probability is 
the likelihood that the actual value is less than or equal to the net disruption.  For example, the 
chance that there will be a net disruption of size equal to 3.5 MMBD or less is 85%, obtained 
from adding the probabilities for 0 MMBD and 3 MMBD.  The converse statement is stated as 
follows:  "the chance that there will be a net disruption of size equal to or greater than 3 MMBD 
is 15% (1–0.85).  In the sample oil disruption risk assessment, note that the likelihood for no 
disruption is the height of the vertical line at 0.  In this simple example, the chance of no 
disruption is 80%. 
 
For this small problem with only two events and six scenarios, it is straightforward to 
translate probability assessments of uncertain events into resulting probability distributions.  In 
the actual risk assessment with twenty one events and millions of scenarios, the cumulative 
probability distribution is a powerful way to compactly summarize and communicate the results 
of the assessments. 
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APPENDIX B:  EVENT DEFINITIONS AND SCALES 
At the initial structuring meeting, the experts conducted a brainstorming session to 
identify as many sources of disruption as possible, along with causes and dependencies.  A 
comprehensive influence diagram (Figure B.1) was developed to represent the breadth of 
discussion and thought processes.  At this stage, the decision to split West of Suez into Africa 
and Latin America had not yet been made, so the diagram shows only West of Suez. 
 
In order to simplify the assessment to a manageable size, and to reflect the key 
parameters that matter most to the risk assessment, the comprehensive influence diagram was 
simplified to the one shown in Figure 1, repeated here again in Figure B.2 for convenience. 
 
Figure B.1.  Comprehensive Influence Diagram of Key Factors Affecting Oil Disruption 
Risks 
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The influence diagram of Figure B.2 has numbered oval nodes that represent the entire 
set of probabilistic inputs in the risk assessment.  This appendix will define the states developed 
by the expert panel for each numbered node, starting with underlying events, then internal 
events, choke points, shortfalls, duration, excess capacity, and finally, oil production. 
Figure B.2.  World Oil Disruption Influence Diagram  
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12.  Russia with West Conflict 
1) No Conflict 
2) Only hybrid* conflict between Russia and any other nation 
3) Military conflict between Russia and only non-NATO nation (s) 
4) Military conflict between Russia and NATO nation 
 
* Hybrid conflict:  see page 4 of National Military Strategy of U.S., 2015 
 
INTERNAL EVENTS 
 To support the development of the scales for the internal events, we split apart the events 
unique to each region from the comprehensive influence diagram of Figure B.1.  This helped to 
provide a logical structure, and it also was a helpful starting point to create scale levels that 
accounted for the range of possible events within each region.  In the following sections, we will 
first show the influence diagram for regional factors that could influence a disruption, and then 
show the associated scale for that region.  The node on the right labeled “Factors” was directly 
assessed, while the other events were implicitly considered when the experts assigned 
likelihoods to the scale levels. 
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Figure B.3. Saudi Arabia Influence Diagram 
 
2. “Saudi” Internal Factors 
1) Continued acceptance of royal family, and insulation from regional instability, no 
major policy-driven outages, Aramco maintains high operating standards 
2) Major policy-driven temporary reduction 
3) Significant but temporary infrastructure problem from attack or technical failure 
and/or isolated conflict that results in attacks on infrastructure without profound 
internal implications 
4) Regional conflict with neighbors combined with internal political crisis, failed 
infrastructure  and/or sabotage which is difficult to fix 
5) Full domestic instability resulting in curtailment of exports 
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Figure B.4. Other Persian Gulf Influence Diagram 
 
3.  “Other Persian Gulf” Internal Factors  
1) Stable regional oil output, Iraq attracts sufficient investment, Iranian agreement holds, 
and no major policy-driven outages 
2) Major policy-driven temporary reduction 
3) Significant but temporary infrastructure problem from attack or technical failure 
and/or isolated conflict that results in attacks on infrastructure without profound 
internal implications 
4) One or more significant regional actors becomes failed states that disrupt production 
and exports 
5) Regional conflict with neighbors combined with internal political crisis, failed 
infrastructure and/or sabotage which is difficult to fix, constraining access to Strait of 
Hormuz 
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Figure B.5. Africa Influence Diagram 
 
16.  Africa Internal Factors 
1) Relative regional stability, limited small attacks/piracy/technical failures; 
countries/companies remain solvent; moderate labor unrest and operational accidents 
2) In 1-2 countries, internal conflict and/or aggressive borderless entities targeting oil 
infrastructure (e.g., ISIS, MEND) 
3) Interstate conflict between 2 countries with significant on shore production resulting 
in damaging assets (e.g., Libya, Egypt); fiscal failure of one or more countries and/or 
companies 
4) Widespread unrest in large region (Arab Spring 2); widespread attacks against oil 
infrastructure; toppling of governments; failed state (s) 
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Figure B.6. Latin America Influence Diagram 
 
19.  Latin America Internal Factors 
1) Relative regional stability; limited small attacks/technical failures; 
countries/companies remain solvent 
2) Some sanctions imposed; disruptive labor unrest and substantial technical/operational 
accidents; fiscal challenges for national oil companies 
3) Interstate conflict between 2 countries with significant on shore production resulting 
in damaging assets (e.g., Venezuela, Columbia) and/or fiscal failure of one or more 
countries and/or companies 
4) Widespread unrest leading to region-wide Pan-American social upheaval; widespread 
attacks against oil infrastructure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Workers
Union
Protest
Technical/
Operational
Failures
Pol
Instability
Venezuela
Pol Unrest
2 or more
Liberalization
Mex Brazil
Fiscal
Failure of
Petrobas
Management
Difficulties
Industrial
Accident
Interstate
Conflict
Latin
America
Factors
Regional
Unrest
Attacks
International
Sanctions
53 
 
 
 
Figure B.7. Russian and Caspian States Influence Diagram 
 
 
13.  “Russia & Caspian States” Internal Factors 
1) Status quo; small isolated attacks 
2) 2-3 of the following:  voluntary production cuts; moderate transit disruptions; 
temporary disruptions from economic/political strife; sabotage /terminal attack 
3) 1-2 of the following:  Large cut-offs resulting from interstate conflict; collapse of a 
major Russian producer; succession crisis in Russia 
4) Major war or disruptions to transit; assumes ban on Russian oil would occur 
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CHOKE POINTS 
4.  Middle East Choke Point 
1) None: 0 MMBD 
2) Partial: 4 MMBD 
3) Full: 8 MMBD 
SHORTFALL VARIABLES 
A disruption is a sudden shortfall in oil production from a world supplier that results in at 
least 2 MMBD unavailable within 1 month of the beginning of the disruption. The size of the 
shortfall is estimated by asking the expert panel to provide the fraction of production lost in a 
given region.  Although the amount of shortfall in each region is a continuous variable, we 
approximate the variable as taking on one of four distinct states, expressed as a fraction of that 
region’s supply.  Taken together with total supply by region from the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration for 2020, we can calculate the shortfall in MMBD.  All Shortfall variables for the 
five regions (Saudi Arabia, Other Persian Gulf, Africa, Latin America, and Russia and Caspian 
States) have the same four states. 
5. Shortfall (same for variables 8, 14, 17, 20) 
1) No shortfall:      0 - 10% of supply 
2) Small shortfall:    >10 - 30% of supply 
3) Medium shortfall:  >30 - 80% of supply 
4) All:          >80% of supply 
 
DURATION 
The duration of a regional shortfall, given that a disruption has occurred is either Short, 
Long, or Very Long.  Another way to characterize the duration of a disruption is to consider the 
question: “Given that a region’s production facilities have been disrupted for the past 30 days, 
what are the chances it will last longer than 6 months?” or “Given that a region’s production 
facilities have been disrupted for the past 6 months, what are the chances it will last longer than 
18 months?”  The scale for this event consists of three levels.  All duration variables have the 
same three states. 
6. Duration (same for variables 9, 15, 18, 21) 
1) Short:   1–6 months 
2) Long:   6–18 months 
3) Very Long:  over 18 months 
55 
 
EXCESS CAPACITY 
7.  “Saudi” Excess Capacity 
The amount of excess oil production capacity (MMBD) available in Saudi Arabia 
midway through the 10-year period 2016 - 2025.  The capacity must be capable of being 
delivered to the world market within 1 month of a disruption.  The scales for this event are: 
1)    0 MMBD 
2) 0.5 MMBD 
3) 1.0 MMBD 
4) 1.5 MMBD 
5) 2.0 MMBD 
10.  “Other Persian Gulf” Excess Capacity 
The amount of excess oil production capacity (MMBD) available from the Other Persian 
Gulf countries midway through the 10-year period 2016 - 2025.  The capacity must be capable of 
being delivered to the world market within 1 month of a disruption.  The scales for this event are: 
1)    0 MMBD  
2) 0.5 MMBD 
 
OIL PRODUCTION 
11.  Oil Production Scenarios 
Three oil production scenarios are representative of the future uncertainty in oil price and 
supply.  The oil price scenarios were qualitative guidelines rather than precise numerical 
forecasts. Within the 10-year risk assessment time frame 2016-2025, we chose the year 2020 as a 
representative year for all three oil capacity scenarios. The scale for this event consists of the 
following three levels: 
 
1) High Price  (world capacity in 2020 = 94.8 MMBD) 
2) Reference Price  (world capacity in 2020 = 97.6 MMBD) 
3) Low Price   (world capacity in 2020 = 99.4 MMBD)  
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APPENDIX C:  PROBABILITY INPUT DATA 
The risk assessment required probability inputs for 7 variable types: 
 Global underlying events 
 Regional internal events 
 Regional shortfall amounts 
 Regional duration 
 Choke Points 
 Excess capacity 
 Future oil production 
 
These inputs accounted for 21 uncertain variables covering over 500 probability inputs.  The 
inputs are numbered according to the influence diagram of Figure 1.  Although some inputs are 
shown in early parts of this report, they are repeated here for completeness. 
 
Table C.1.  Probabilities for Middle East Conflict 
 
 
  
 1  Middle East Conflict
Ref Pr Low Pr High Pr
5% 5% 15% 1. Minimal conflicts and relatively stable geopolitics (like prior to Arab Spring)
20% 20% 10% 2.
Domestic persistent unrest (political/religious/ethnic) in many Middle East and 
North Africa countries
35% 30% 35% 3.
Unrest in many middle east countries including strife with insurgent groups (like 
current)
25% 30% 20% 4.
Growing unrest/strife in many Middle Eastern countries combined with:
a) may or may not close key choke points, key facilities and/or
b) Coordinated supply reductions across countries (including embargoes or 
15% 15% 20% 5.
Interstate military conflict between standing governments in the Middle East
  a) may or may not close key choke points, key facilities, supply regions
  b) 2 or more countries: e.g. Saudi Arabia vs. Iran, Iran vs. Iraq, Russia vs. West, 
       possible U.S./Israeli involvement
Oil Price Scenarios
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Table C.2.  Probabilities for Russia with West Conflict 
 
 
Table C.3.  Probabilities for Saudi Internal Events 
 
 
  
12  Russia with West Conflict
Ref Pr Low Pr High Pr
1% 1% 1% 1. No conflict
74% 64% 64% 2. Only hybrid* conflict between Russia and any other nation (like current)
20% 30% 30% 3. Conflict between Russia and only Non-NATO Nation (s)
5% 5% 5% 4. Conflict between Russia and NATO Nation
Oil Price Scenarios
 2  Saudi Internal Factors
Ref Pr Low Pr High Pr
40% 30% 50% 1.
Continued acceptance of royal family, and insulation from regional instability, no 
major policy-driven outages, Aramco maintains high operating standards
20% 25% 15% 2. Major policy-driven temporary reduction
15% 15% 15% 3.
Significant but temporary infrastructure problem from attack or technical failure 
and/or isolated conflict that results in attacks on infrastructure without profound 
internal implications
15% 15% 15% 4.
Regional conflict with neighbors combined with internal political crisis, failed 
infrastructure  and/or sabotage which is difficult to fix
10% 15% 5% 5. Full domestic instability
Oil Price Scenarios
58 
 
Table C.4.  Probabilities for Other Persian Gulf Internal Events 
 
 
Table C.5.  Probabilities for Africa Internal Events 
 
 
  
 3  Other Persian Gulf Internal Factors
Ref Pr Low Pr High Pr
35% 25% 45% 1.
Stable regional oil output, Iraq attracts sufficient investment, Iranian agreement 
holds, and no major policy-driven outages
10% 10% 5% 2. Major policy-driven temporary reduction
20% 25% 20% 3.
Significant but temporary infrastructure problem from attack or technical failure 
and/or isolated conflict that results in attacks on infrastructure without profound 
internal implications
20% 25% 15% 4.
One or more significant regional actors becomes failed states that disrupt 
production and exports
15% 15% 15% 5.
Regional conflict with neighbors combined with internal political crisis, failed 
infrastructure and/or sabotage which is difficult to fix, constraining access to Strait 
of Hormuz
Oil Price Scenarios
 16  Africa Internal Factors
Ref Pr Low Pr High Pr
5% 1% 15% 1.
Relative regional stability, limited small attacks/piracy/technical failures; 
countries/companies remain solvent; moderate labor unrest and operational 
accidents
70% 80% 70% 2.
In 1-2 countries, internal conflict and/or aggressive borderless entities targeting oil 
infrastructure (e.g., ISIS, MEND)
15% 4% 10% 3.
Interstate conflict between 2 countries with significant on shore production resulting 
in damaging assets (e.g., Libya, Egypt); fiscal failure of one or more countries 
and/or companies
10% 15% 5% 4.
Widespread unrest in large region (Arab Spring 2); widespread attacks against oil 
infrastructure; toppling of governments; failed state (s)
Oil Price Scenarios
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Table C.6.  Probabilities for Latin America Internal Events 
 
 
Table C.7.  Probabilities for Russia and Caspian States Internal Events 
 
 
 19  Latin America Internal Factors
Ref Pr Low Pr High Pr
40% 1% 54% 1.
Relative regional stability; limited small attacks/technical failures; 
countries/companies remain solvent
50% 64% 40% 2.
Some sanctions imposed; disruptive labor unrest and substantial 
technical/operational accidents; fiscal challenges for national oil companies
5% 25% 5% 3.
Interstate conflict between 2 countries with significant on shore production resulting 
in damaging assets (e.g., Venezuela, Columbia) and/or fiscal failure of one or 
more countries and/or companies
5% 10% 1% 4.
Widespread unrest leading to region-wide Pan-American social upheaval; 
widespread attacks against oil infrastructure 
Oil Price Scenarios
 13  Russia & Caspian States Internal Factors
Ref Pr Low Pr High Pr
30% 15% 50% 1. Status quo; small isolated attacks
45% 50% 30% 2.
2-3 of the following:  voluntary production cuts; moderate transit disruptions; 
temporary disruptions from economic/political strife; sabotage /terminal attack
20% 30% 15% 3.
1-2 of the following:  Large cut-offs resulting from interstate conflict; collapse of a 
major Russian producer; succession crisis in Russia
5% 5% 5% 4. Major war or disruptions to transit; assumes ban on Russian oil would occur 
Oil Price Scenarios
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Table C.8.  Probabilities for Saudi Shortfall Amount 
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Table C.9.  Probabilities for Other Persian Gulf Shortfall Amount 
 
8 Other Persian Gulf Shortfall
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Table C.10.  Probabilities for Africa Shortfall Amount 
 
 
Table C.11.  Probabilities for Latin America Shortfall Amount 
 
 
17 Africa Shortfall
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remain solvent; 
moderate labor unrest
internal conflict and/or 
aggressive borderless 
entities targeting oil 
infrastructure
Interstate conflict with 
damaged assets; fiscal 
failure
Widespread unrest in 
large region (Arab 
Spring 2)
None (<10%) 80% 40% 10% 1%
Small (10-30%) 20% 60% 80% 60%
Medium (30-80%) 0% 0% 10% 39%
All (>80%) 0% 0% 0% 0%
S
h
o
rt
fa
ll
 
A
m
o
u
n
t
20 Latin America Shortfall
L
a
ti
n
 A
m
e
ri
c
a
 I
n
te
rn
a
l 
F
a
c
to
rs
Relative regional 
stability; limited small 
attacks/technical 
failures; 
countries/companies 
remain solvent
Some sanctions 
imposed; disruptive 
labor unrest and 
substantial 
technical/operational 
accidents; fiscal 
challenges for national 
oil companies
Interstate conflict 
between 2 countries 
with significant on 
shore production 
resulting in damaging 
assets (e.g., 
Venezuela, Columbia) 
and/or fiscal failure of 
one or more countries 
and/or companies
Widespread unrest 
leading to region-wide 
Pan-American social 
upheaval; widespread 
attacks against oil 
infrastructure 
None (<10%) 90% 80% 0% 0%
Small (10-30%) 9% 18% 50% 39%
Medium (30-80%) 1% 2% 50% 60%
All (>80%) 0% 0% 0% 1%
S
h
o
rt
fa
ll
 
A
m
o
u
n
t
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Table C.12.  Probabilities for Russia and Caspian States Shortfall Amount 
 
14 Russia & Caspian States Shortfall
R
u
s
s
ia
&
 C
a
s
p
ia
n
 S
ta
te
s
 
In
te
rn
a
l 
F
a
c
to
rs
Status quo; small 
isolated attacks
voluntary production 
cuts; moderate transit 
disruptions; temp 
disruptions from 
economic/political 
strife; sabotage 
/terminal attack
Large cut-offs resulting 
from interstate conflict; 
collapse of a major 
Russian producer; 
succession crisis in 
Russia
Major war or disruptions 
to transit; assumes ban 
on Russian oil would 
occur 
None (<10%) 98% 75% 18% 0%
Small (10-30%) 2% 25% 50% 65%
Medium (30-80%) 0% 0% 30% 32%
All (>80%) 0% 0% 2% 3%
R
u
s
s
ia
&
 C
a
s
p
ia
n
 S
ta
te
s
 
In
te
rn
a
l 
F
a
c
to
rs
Status quo; small 
isolated attacks
voluntary production 
cuts; moderate transit 
disruptions; temp 
disruptions from 
economic/political 
strife; sabotage 
/terminal attack
Large cut-offs resulting 
from interstate conflict; 
collapse of a major 
Russian producer; 
succession crisis in 
Russia
Major war or disruptions 
to transit; assumes ban 
on Russian oil would 
occur 
None (<10%) 98% 70% 18% 0%
Small (10-30%) 2% 30% 50% 65%
Medium (30-80%) 0% 0% 30% 32%
All (>80%) 0% 0% 2% 3%
R
u
s
s
ia
&
 C
a
s
p
ia
n
 S
ta
te
s
 
In
te
rn
a
l 
F
a
c
to
rs
Status quo; small 
isolated attacks
voluntary production 
cuts; moderate transit 
disruptions; temp 
disruptions from 
economic/political 
strife; sabotage 
/terminal attack
Large cut-offs resulting 
from interstate conflict; 
collapse of a major 
Russian producer; 
succession crisis in 
Russia
slightly higher change 
to have a negative 
production impact than 
scenario above
None (<10%) 80% 60% 10% 0%
Small (10-30%) 20% 40% 55% 60%
Medium (30-80%) 0% 0% 33% 37%
All (>80%) 0% 0% 2% 3%
R
u
s
s
ia
&
 C
a
s
p
ia
n
 S
ta
te
s
 
In
te
rn
a
l 
F
a
c
to
rs
Status quo; small 
isolated attacks
voluntary production 
cuts; moderate transit 
disruptions; temp 
disruptions from 
economic/political 
strife; sabotage 
/terminal attack
Large cut-offs resulting 
from interstate conflict; 
collapse of a major 
Russian producer; 
succession crisis in 
Russia
Major war or disruptions 
to transit; assumes ban 
on Russian oil would 
occur 
None (<10%) 75% 40% 0% 0%
Small (10-30%) 25% 55% 48% 25%
Medium (30-80%) 0% 5% 50% 70%
All (>80%) 0% 0% 2% 5%
Russia-West Conflict:  None
Russia-West Conflict:  Only hybrid* conflict
S
h
o
rt
fa
ll
 
A
m
o
u
n
t
S
h
o
rt
fa
ll
 
A
m
o
u
n
t
Russia-West Conflict:  Conflict Russia/Western Non-Nato nation
S
h
o
rt
fa
ll
 
A
m
o
u
n
t
Russia-West Conflict:  Conflict Russia/Western NATO nation
S
h
o
rt
fa
ll
 
A
m
o
u
n
t
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Table C.13.  Probabilities for Saudi Duration 
 
 
 
 
 
  
6 Saudi Duration
SAUDI Group A Group B Group C
Short (1-6mo) 80% 20% 10%
Long (6-18mo) 10% 60% 20%
Very Long (>18mo) 10% 20% 70%D
u
ra
ti
o
n
Stable
Major policy-
driven reduction
Tech Failure or 
Isolated Conflict
Regional Failed 
State
Regional Conflict 
w/ Internal Crisis
1.
Minimal conflicts and relatively stable geopolitics (like prior to Arab 
Spring) Group A Group A Group A Group A Group C
2.
Domestic persistent unrest (political/religious/ethnic) in many Middle 
East and North Africa countries Group A Group A Group A Group B Group C
3.
Unrest in many middle east countries including strife with insurgent 
groups (like current) Group A Group A Group B Group C Group C
4.
Growing unrest/strife in many Middle Eastern countries combined 
with:
a) may or may not close key choke points, key facilities and/or
b) Coordinated supply reductions across countries (including 
embargoes or sanctions)
Group B Group B Group C Group C Group C
5.
Interstate military conflict between standing governments in the 
Middle East
a) may or may not close key choke points, key facilities, supply 
regions
b) 2 or more countries: e.g. Saudi Arabia vs. Iran, Iran vs. Iraq, Russia 
vs. West, possible U.S./Israeli involvement
Group B Group B Group C Group C Group C
Saudi Internal Factors
M
id
d
le
 E
a
s
t 
C
o
n
fl
ic
t
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Table C.14.  Probabilities for Other Persian Gulf Duration 
 
 
 
 
  
9 Other Persian Gulf Duration
OPG Group A Group B Group C
Short (1-6mo) 70% 15% 10%
Long (6-18mo) 15% 60% 15%
Very Long (>18mo) 15% 25% 75%D
u
ra
ti
o
n
Stable
Major policy-
driven reduction
Tech Failure or 
Isolated Conflict
Regional Failed 
State
Regional Conflict 
w/ Internal Crisis
1.
Minimal conflicts and relatively stable geopolitics (like prior to Arab 
Spring) Group A Group A Group A Group B Group C
2.
Domestic persistent unrest (political/religious/ethnic) in many Middle 
East and North Africa countries Group A Group A Group A Group B Group C
3.
Unrest in many middle east countries including strife with insurgent 
groups (like current) Group A Group A Group B Group C Group C
4.
Growing unrest/strife in many Middle Eastern countries combined 
with:
a) may or may not close key choke points, key facilities and/or
b) Coordinated supply reductions across countries (including 
embargoes or sanctions)
Group B Group B Group C Group C Group C
5.
Interstate military conflict between standing governments in the 
Middle East
a) may or may not close key choke points, key facilities, supply 
regions
b) 2 or more countries: e.g. Saudi Arabia vs. Iran, Iran vs. Iraq, Russia 
vs. West, possible U.S./Israeli involvement
Group B Group B Group C Group C Group C
Other Persian Gulf Internal Factors
M
id
d
le
 E
a
s
t 
C
o
n
fl
ic
t
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Table C.15.  Probabilities for Africa Duration 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C.16.  Probabilities for Latin America Duration 
 
 
 
  
18 Africa Duration
A
fr
ic
a
 I
n
te
rn
a
l 
F
a
c
to
rs
Relative regional 
stability, limited small 
attacks/piracy/technica
l failures; 
countries/companies 
remain solvent; 
moderate labor unrest
internal conflict and/or 
aggressive borderless 
entities targeting oil 
infrastructure
Interstate conflict with 
damaged assets; fiscal 
failure
Widespread unrest in 
large region (Arab 
Spring 2); toppling of 
governements; failed 
state (s)
Short (1-6mo) 80% 50% 20% 10%
Long (6-18mo) 10% 30% 30% 20%
Very Long (>18mo) 10% 20% 50% 70%D
u
ra
ti
o
n
21 Latin America Duration
L
a
ti
n
 A
m
e
ri
c
a
 I
n
te
rn
a
l 
F
a
c
to
rs
Relative regional 
stability; limited small 
attacks/technical 
failures; 
countries/companies 
remain solvent
Some sanctions 
imposed; disruptive 
labor unrest and 
substantial 
technical/operational 
accidents; fiscal 
challenges for national 
oil companies
Interstate conflict 
between 2 countries 
with significant on 
shore production 
resulting in damaging 
assets (e.g., 
Venezuela, Columbia) 
and/or fiscal failure of 
one or more countries 
and/or companies
Widespread unrest 
leading to region-wide 
Pan-American social 
upheaval; widespread 
attacks against oil 
infrastructure 
Short (1-6mo) 80% 50% 30% 10%
Long (6-18mo) 10% 30% 30% 30%
Very Long (>18mo) 10% 20% 40% 60%D
u
ra
ti
o
n
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Table C.17.  Probabilities for Russia and Caspian States Duration 
 
 
 
15 Russia & Caspian States Duration
R
u
s
s
ia
&
 C
a
s
p
ia
n
 S
ta
te
s
 
In
te
rn
a
l 
F
a
c
to
rs
Status quo; small 
isolated attacks
voluntary production 
cuts; moderate transit 
disruptions; temp 
disruptions from 
economic/political 
strife; sabotage 
/terminal attack
Large cut-offs resulting 
from interstate conflict; 
collapse of a major 
Russian producer; 
succession crisis in 
Russia
Major war or disruptions 
to transit; assumes ban 
on Russian oil would 
occur 
Short (1-6mo) 98% 95% 90% 85%
Long (6-18mo) 2% 4% 7% 10%
Very Long (>18mo) 0% 1% 3% 5%
R
u
s
s
ia
&
 C
a
s
p
ia
n
 S
ta
te
s
 
In
te
rn
a
l 
F
a
c
to
rs
Status quo; small 
isolated attacks
voluntary production 
cuts; moderate transit 
disruptions; temp 
disruptions from 
economic/political 
strife; sabotage 
/terminal attack
Large cut-offs resulting 
from interstate conflict; 
collapse of a major 
Russian producer; 
succession crisis in 
Russia
Major war or disruptions 
to transit; assumes ban 
on Russian oil would 
occur 
Short (1-6mo) 98% 97% 80% 70%
Long (6-18mo) 2% 2% 15% 20%
Very Long (>18mo) 0% 1% 5% 10%
R
u
s
s
ia
&
 C
a
s
p
ia
n
 S
ta
te
s
 
In
te
rn
a
l 
F
a
c
to
rs
Status quo; small 
isolated attacks
voluntary production 
cuts; moderate transit 
disruptions; temp 
disruptions from 
economic/political 
strife; sabotage 
/terminal attack
Large cut-offs resulting 
from interstate conflict; 
collapse of a major 
Russian producer; 
succession crisis in 
Russia
Major war or disruptions 
to transit; assumes ban 
on Russian oil would 
occur 
Short (1-6mo) 98% 80% 70% 55%
Long (6-18mo) 2% 19% 25% 30%
Very Long (>18mo) 0% 1% 5% 15%
R
u
s
s
ia
&
 C
a
s
p
ia
n
 S
ta
te
s
 
In
te
rn
a
l 
F
a
c
to
rs
Status quo; small 
isolated attacks
voluntary production 
cuts; moderate transit 
disruptions; temp 
disruptions from 
economic/political 
strife; sabotage 
/terminal attack
Large cut-offs resulting 
from interstate conflict; 
collapse of a major 
Russian producer; 
succession crisis in 
Russia
Major war or disruptions 
to transit; assumes ban 
on Russian oil would 
occur 
Short (1-6mo) 98% 70% 20% 1%
Long (6-18mo) 2% 29% 60% 2%
Very Long (>18mo) 0% 1% 20% 97%
Russia-West Conflict:  Conflict Russia/Non-Nato
D
u
ra
ti
o
n
Russia-West Conflict:  Conflict Russia/NATO
D
u
ra
ti
o
n
Russia-West Conflict:  None
Russia-West Conflict:  Only Hybrid Conflict
D
u
ra
ti
o
n
D
u
ra
ti
o
n
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Table C.18.  Probabilities for Middle East Choke Point 
 
 
Table C.19.  Probabilities for Saudi Excess Capacity 
 
 
Table C.20.  Probabilities for Other Persian Gulf Excess Capacity 
 
 
Table C.21.  Probabilities for Oil Production Scenarios 
 
4  Middle East Choke Points
0 4MMBD 8 MMBD
100% 0% 0% 1. Minimal conflicts and relatively stable geopolitics (like prior to Arab Spring)
99% 1% 0% 2.
Domestic persistent unrest (political/religious/ethnic) in many Middle East and North 
Africa countries
95% 5% 0% 3. Unrest in many middle east countries including strife with insurgent groups (like current)
85% 14% 1% 4.
Growing unrest/strife in many Middle Eastern countries combined with:
a) may or may not close key choke points, key facilities and/or
b) Coordinated supply reductions across countries (including embargoes or sanctions)
20% 60% 20% 5.
Interstate military conflict between standing governments in the Middle East
  a) may or may not close key choke points, key facilities, supply regions
  b) 2 or more countries: e.g. Saudi Arabia vs. Iran, Iran vs. Iraq, Russia vs. West, 
       possible U.S./Israeli involvement
Choke
7 Saudi Excess Capacity
None 25%
0.5 MMBD 5%
1 MMBD 25%
1.5 MMBD 25%
2 MMBD 20%
10 Other Persian Gulf Excess Capacity
None 85%
0.5 MMBD 15%
11 World Oil Production 2020
30%   High Price Case  (94.8 MMBD; OPEC Share=35%)
40%   Reference Price Case  (97.6 MMBD; OPEC Share=40%)
30%   Low Price Case  (99.4 MMBD; OPEC Share=44%)
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APPENDIX D:  DISRUPTION SIZE AND OVERLAP 
 
When oil disruptions occur in two or more regions, they either overlap and occur 
simultaneously in the 10-yr horizon, or do not overlap so that the supply is brought back to 
original levels prior to the next disruption event.  For purposes of simulating the possible 
scenarios of disruption timing, the 10-year horizon is divided into twenty 6-month periods.  For 
each region that has a disruption, the timing of the initial period of the disruption is treated as 
uncertain, with a uniform probability distribution over the twenty periods.  In addition to the five 
regions that have been discussed, we have added a 6th region:  The Strait of Hormuz, which is 
treated as a pseudo-region with its own initial period (the first period the disruption occurs) and 
duration of disruption (how long the disruption lasts). 
  
The duration of each disruption can be either Short, Long or Very Long.  A Short 
duration disruption is assumed to occur in one period (6 months), a Long disruption in two 
periods (12 months), and a Very Long disruption in 4 periods (24 months).  
 
In periods in which more than one disruption occurs, shortfalls are added to calculate the 
total amount of disruption for that period.  Figure D.1 shows a possible scenario of the timing of 
disruptions in four regions.  The total disruption in period 11 would be the sum of the Africa 
shortfall and the Russia/Caspian shortfall. 
 
Figure D.1.  Timeline for Disruptions 
 
 
To determine the net disruption, the total disruption in each period is reduced by the 
amount of the excess capacity (Saudi plus Other Persian Gulf) for the scenario in question.  
 
The maximum Short (6-month) net disruption is the maximum net disruption over the 
twenty periods.  
 
 
 
Saudi
Other Persian Gulf
Africa
Latin America
Russia/Caspian
Strait of Hormuz
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
<----- 6-month intervals  in 10-year time period 2016-2025 ----->
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The maximum Long (12-month) net disruption is the maximum of the minimum6 
disruption for each of the 19 two-period subintervals in the 10-year horizon.  The subintervals 
consist of periods 1&2, 2&3, ..., 19&20.  In the example shown in Figure D.1, the only two-
period subinterval with disruption in both of its periods is 10&11.  Thus, the maximum Long net 
disruption would be the level of the Africa shortfall, less the excess capacity, or zero if the 
excess capacity is more than the Africa shortfall. 
 
Similarly, the maximum Very Long (24-month) net disruption is the maximum of the 
minimum disruption for each of the 17 four-period subintervals in the 10-year horizon.  The 
subintervals consist of periods 1-4, 2-5, ..., 17-20.  In the example above, there is no four-period 
subinterval with nonzero disruption in all of its periods, hence the maximum Very Long net 
disruption would be zero.  
 
In the 2005 study, we approximated the overlap by estimating a probability of overlap for 
short, long, and very long disruptions.  In the current study, this approximation is replaced by a 
bottoms-up perspective wherein we consider disruptions period by period. 
                                                 
6 For each 12-month period, we must take the minimum disruption.  For example, if the first 6-month period had 2 
MMBD disrupted, and the 2nd 6-month period had 3 MMBD disrupted, a Long disruption lasting 12 months should 
have a size of 2 MMBD, the minimum disruption over the 12-month period.  In this example, the size of 3 MMBD 
is a Short duration disruption, not a long duration disruption 
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APPENDIX E:  HISTORICAL DISRUPTIONS 
Table E.1.  Historical Disruptions  
 
Source: Compiled from the U.S. EIA by Paul Leiby. See EIA website, "Global Oil Supply 
Disruptions Since 1951," http://www.eia.doe.gov/security/distable.html  for one version of these 
data.  Categorizations suggested by Paul Leiby. 
Appendix D:  Historical Disruptions 
Oil Supply Disruption Event Start Date
Disruption 
Length
Gross 
Shortfall
# Description Cause of Disruption Months Months MMBD
1 Iranian Fields Nationalized Embargo/Economic Dispute 03/01/51 44.7 0.7
2 Suez War Mideast War 11/01/56 5.0 2.0
3 Syrian Transit Fee Dispute Embargo/Economic Dispute 12/01/66 4.0 0.7
4 Six Day War Mideast War 06/01/67 3.1 2.0
5 Nigerian Civil War Internal Struggle 07/01/67 16.3 0.5
6 Libyan Price Controversy Embargo/Economic Dispute 05/01/70 9.2 1.3
7 Algerian-French Nat'l Struggle Internal Struggle 04/01/71 5.1 0.6
8 Lebanese Political Conflict Internal Struggle 03/01/73 3.1 0.5
9 October Arab-Israeli War Mideast War & Embargo/Economic Dispute10/01/73 6.1 1.6
10 Civil War in Lebanon Internal Struggle 04/01/76 2.0 0.3
11 Damage at Saudi Oilfield Accident 05/01/77 1.0 0.7
12 Iranian Revolution Internal Struggle 11/01/78 6.0 3.7
13 Outbreak of Iran-Iraq War Mideast War 10/01/80 4.1 3.0
14 UK Piper Alpha Offsh. Plat. Expl. Accident 07/01/88 17.3 0.3
15 UK Fulmer Float. Stor. Vess. Acc. Accident 12/01/88 4.0 0.2
16 Exxon Valdez Accident Accident 03/24/89 0.5 1.0
17 UK Cormorant Offshore Platform Accident 04/01/89 3.0 0.5
18 Iraq-Kuwait War Mideast War & Embargo/Economic Dispute08/01/90 12.0 4.6
19 Unilateral Embargo on Iran Embargo/Economic Dispute 8/1/1995 1.0 0.2
20 Norwegian Oil Workers Strike Internal Struggle 5/1/1996 1.0 1.0
21 Local Protests in Nigeria Internal Struggle 3/1/1997 1.0 0.2
22 Local Protests in Nigeria Internal Struggle 3/1/1998 3.0 0.3
23 OPEC (ex. Iraq) cuts production Embargo/Economic Dispute 4/1/1999 12.0 3.3
24 Venezuelan Oil Strike Internal Struggle 12/2/2002 2.5 2.0
25 Iraq War Mideast War 3/19/2003 1.4 1.9
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